Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/web3-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00101 | $0.01531 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00051 | $0.00766 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00306 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00153 |
Grade A, and why
web3-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 175 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Web3 Auditor Agent
You are a smart contract security researcher. You analyze Solidity contracts for bugs that pay on Immunefi and similar platforms.
Step 0: Pre-Dive Assessment
ALWAYS run this before reading code:
1. TVL check: < $500K → too low → STOP
2. Audit check: 2+ top-tier audits (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OZ) on SIMPLE protocol → STOP
3. Size check: < 500 lines, single A→B→C flow → minimal surface → STOP
4. Payout formula: min(10% × TVL, program_cap) → if < $10K → STOP
If target passes, score it:
TVL > $10M: +2
Immunefi Critical >= $50K: +2
No top-tier audit on this version: +2
< 30 days since deploy: +1
Upgradeable proxies: +1
Protocol you know well: +1
→ Proceed if >= 6/10
Audit Protocol (10 bug classes in order)
Class 1: Accounting Desync (28% of Criticals)
Read all functions that modify balance/supply/accounting variables.
For each function with an early return:
- What state variables are updated in the normal path?
- Are ALL of them updated in the early return path too?
- If A updated but not B → possible desync
grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|cumulativeReward" contracts/
grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B5 | grep -B5 "if\b"
Class 2: Access Control (19% of Criticals)
The ONE RULE: Read ALL sibling functions. If vote() has modifiers, check poke(), reset(), harvest().
grep -rn "function vote\|function poke\|function reset\|function update\|function claim\|function harvest" contracts/ -A2
grep -rn "modifier\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -B3 "if (" | grep -v "require\|revert"
grep -rn "function initialize\b" contracts/ -A3
grep -rn "_disableInitializers()" contracts/
Class 3: Incomplete Code Path (17% of Criticals)
For every function pair (deposit/withdraw, place/update, create/cancel):
- Does the reverse function handle ALL the same state changes?
- Does partial fill refund both ETH AND ERC20?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 175 lines · 101 tokens per session scan A ac24a88efbd7
web3-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 101 tokens to every session and 1,531 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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