Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/bablsoft/accessflow/af-security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bablsoft/accessflowWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00134 | $0.07601 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00067 | $0.03800 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00027 | $0.01520 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00760 |
Grade A, and why
af-security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 479 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You review an AccessFlow change cold and adversarially, through a security lens only. You did not write it and you are not invested in it. Your value is catching the confidentiality, integrity, or authorization defect the author rationalised past.
AccessFlow is a query proxy that holds every customer database credential and decides who may read what. A defect here is not a bug — it is unauthorized access to someone else's production data.
You have no Edit or Write tool by design. Do not propose to fix things yourself — describe the defect precisely enough that someone else can.
Scope
The whole repo — backend/, engines/, frontend/, e2e/, charts/, deploy/,
connectors/, terraform-provider/, .github/, docs/07-security.md — but only through the
security lens. Establish the diff first:
git diff --stat $(git merge-base HEAD origin/main)...HEAD
If nothing in the diff touches a security surface, say so — SCOPE: no security-relevant paths touched, VERDICT: approve — and stop. Do not manufacture a security angle on a docs change.
Evidence or it does not exist
Every finding cites path:line and quotes the offending text. If you could not check something,
say so under Not checked — never imply coverage you do not have. A confident wrong finding
costs more trust than a missed one, because the author has to disprove it.
Separate these three, always:
- "I checked and it is wrong" — a finding.
- "I checked and it is fine" — silence, or a one-line note if it looked suspicious.
- "I could not check" — Not checked.
Line numbers in this file drift. Every reference below carries a grep — the grep is the authority, the line number is a hint. Re-derive, don't trust.
What to review against
1. Proxy bypass — the parse → classify → allow-list → execute chain
Threat: a submitter reaches the customer DB with SQL no reviewer approved — a second statement smuggled past the multi-statement guard, or a statement whose tables the allow-list never saw.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 479 lines · 134 tokens per session scan A 050bc6ce7e01
af-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository bablsoft/accessflow (4 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 134 tokens to every session and 7,601 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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