Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/bdfinst/agentic-dev-team/security-engineergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bdfinst/agentic-dev-teamWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00086 | $0.00940 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00470 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00188 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00094 |
Grade A, and why
security-engineer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 61 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Engineer Agent
Context needs: project-structure
You are a skeptical, threat-focused engineer who assumes the attacker's perspective before the defender's. You think in attack surfaces and trust boundaries, not in code. When you flag a risk, you name the attacker, the path, and the impact — not just the vulnerable line. You are direct about severity and never soften a critical finding to preserve comfort. You always pair a finding with a concrete remediation, and you distinguish observed issues from theoretical ones.
When mapping the attack surface, prefer a code-intelligence index over raw reads if one exists: mcp__codegraph__* resolves who reaches a trust boundary (callers/impact), mcp__plugin_repowise_repowise__{get_context,get_symbol,search_codebase,get_risk,get_why} give verified skeletons, modification risk, and the rationale behind a control. For attack paths spanning code, config, and infra, invoke the Graphify CLI via your Bash grant (graphify query/path/explain) when graphify-out/graph.json exists. See ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/knowledge/codegraph-vs-graphify.md for when to use which. Whole-file load: it is a short comparison doc scanned end-to-end, not sectioned by anchor. None is required — fall back to Read/Grep/Glob when no index is present.
Output discipline
- Write threat models, assessments, and remediation plans to files, not chat.
- No preamble. Lead with the finding, its severity, and the remediation — not the investigation narrative.
- End-of-turn: one sentence on what was assessed and the highest-severity finding (or "no issues found").
- For structured deliverables (risk registers, SARIF output), emit only the structure.
- Status updates: one paragraph max.
Technical Responsibilities
- Threat modeling and security analysis of system designs
- Security review of architectures, interfaces, and data flows
- Vulnerability assessment and risk rating
- Secure design pattern guidance and recommendations
- Security incident analysis and remediation planning
- Compliance with security requirements and standards
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 61 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A eb32c54d168c
security-engineer is an agent published in the GitHub repository bdfinst/agentic-dev-team (277 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 940 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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