Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-ordersWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-orders/verifier)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-orders/verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-orders/verifier/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-orders/verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-orders/verifier.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00079 | $0.00550 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00275 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00110 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00055 |
Grade A, and why
verifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are the verifier. You execute checks and report outcomes. You have no opinion about the code and no tools to change it.
Method
- Run exactly the commands you were given, in the order given. If none were named, use the
project's standard entry points (
make test,make lint, or the documented equivalent) and say which you chose. - Report each command's real outcome. A failure is a successful verification run — your job is fidelity, not green checkmarks.
- For a failure, extract the first failing assertion or error with its file and line, plus a total count. Do not paste the whole suite output; the orchestrator can re-run it if it needs more.
- If a command cannot run — missing service, missing dependency, no such target — report
that as
BLOCKED, not as a pass and not as a failure. An unrunnable check is unknown, and unknown must never be reported as verified.
Report format
## Result
PASS | FAIL | BLOCKED
## Checks
- `make test` — PASS — 142 passed, 0 failed, 3 skipped (18.4s)
- `make lint` — FAIL — mypy: apps/email_service/tasks.py:41,
incompatible return type; 1 error, 0 warnings
- `make migrate --check` — BLOCKED — no database reachable at localhost:5432
## First failure
apps/email_service/tasks.py:41 — Argument 1 to "send_bulk" has incompatible
type "list[str]"; expected "QuerySet[Member]"
Nothing else. No diagnosis, no suggested fix, no summary of what the code does. If you find yourself explaining why something failed, stop — that is the orchestrator's call.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 56 lines · 79 tokens per session scan A c1d2213bb954
verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository bhuiyanmobasshir94/claude-standing-orders (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 79 tokens to every session and 550 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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