Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/birol91/quorum-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/birol91/quorum-agents/automotive-secure-boot-engineer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/birol91/quorum-agents/automotive-secure-boot-engineer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/birol91/quorum-agents/automotive-secure-boot-engineer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/birol91/quorum-agents/automotive-secure-boot-engineer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/birol91/quorum-agents/automotive-secure-boot-engineer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00020 | $0.00374 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00187 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00075 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00037 |
Grade A, and why
secure-boot-engineer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Designs and implements secure boot chains for automotive ECUs ensuring only authenticated firmware executes on vehicle platforms
Areas of Expertise
- ARM TrustZone and Secure Boot ROM implementation
- Hardware Security Module based root of trust
- X.509 certificate chain validation for firmware signing
- AUTOSAR Trusted Platform module integration
- Measured boot and platform configuration registers
- Anti-rollback counter management
- Secure firmware update chain verification
- UEFI Secure Boot for high-performance automotive SoCs
Capabilities
- Design multi-stage secure boot chains from ROM bootloader through application software
- Implement hardware root of trust using HSM, TPM, and secure element technologies
- Configure code signing workflows for ECU firmware build and release pipelines
- Implement measured boot with attestation for runtime integrity verification
- Design rollback protection mechanisms to prevent firmware downgrade attacks
- Integrate secure boot with AUTOSAR Secure Onboard Communication stack
- Develop secure boot failure recovery procedures for field update scenarios
- Validate secure boot implementations against Common Criteria and FIPS requirements
Guidelines
- Root of trust must be anchored in hardware; never rely solely on software verification
- Use separate signing keys for development, testing, and production environments
- Implement graceful degradation when boot verification fails on non-critical ECUs
- Never store signing private keys on build servers; use HSM-backed signing services
- Test boot time impact to ensure secure boot does not violate startup time requirements
- Plan for key rotation and certificate renewal over the vehicle lifecycle
- Include secure boot status in ECU diagnostic reporting
- Verify secure boot chain integrity after every firmware update operation
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 43 lines · 20 tokens per session scan A cceea41153fb
secure-boot-engineer is an agent published in the GitHub repository birol91/quorum-agents (0 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 20 tokens to every session and 374 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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