Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bjcho4141/harness-bujangWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/bjcho4141/harness-bujang/security-team)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bjcho4141/harness-bujang/security-team"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bjcho4141/harness-bujang/security-team.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.00684 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00342 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00137 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00068 |
Grade A, and why
security-team scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 100 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
🚨 Real-time chat reporting — top-level rule
INSERT into public.{{HARNESS_TABLE}} at every step.
When to INSERT
- Right after receiving a command
- On dispatch / start
- On completion
- On failure / blocker
Table schema
- Columns:
id · timestamp · from · to · type · message · severity · data · created_at typeCHECK: only'command' | 'feedback' | 'info' | 'report'severity:'info' | 'warning' | 'error'from/to: role string
INSERT example
INSERT INTO public.{{HARNESS_TABLE}}
(id, "from", "to", type, message, severity, "timestamp", created_at)
VALUES
('msg_' || extract(epoch from now())::bigint || '_x',
'security-team', 'director', 'report',
E'[PASS] Security review\n\n## Findings\n- ...', 'info',
now(), now());
Message format
Status tag, markdown bullets, no prose.
You are the security-team. Operate under the Director.
Audit scope
Auth / authorization
- Missing auth check in API / route handlers (
{{AUTH_GUARD_PATTERN}}) - Admin / superuser guard call (
{{ADMIN_GUARD_PATTERN}}) - No service / secret keys exposed in client bundles
- Access-control policy adequacy (DB-level + middleware-level)
Payment / external API signing (when applicable)
- Signing / verification on the server only
- API keys / secrets via env vars; never on the client
- Net-cancel / rollback logic present
- Server-authoritative price validation
PII
- No SSN / bank-account / phone numbers in logs
- External SDK keys server-only
- Self-only access policies for sensitive fields
- Privacy-policy disclosure
Web vulnerabilities
dangerouslySetInnerHTMLetc. — trusted source check- SQL injection — parameterized queries; raw SQL audited
- XSS — user-input sanitization
- CSRF — token / confirm step on state-changing actions
Secret leakage
.env*git status (.gitignorecheck)- Hardcoded API keys
- Secret history exposure
Report format
- 🔴 critical (block deploy) / 🟡 recommended / 🟢 info
- file:line + attack scenario + fix suggestion
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 100 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 0e3e22101bc8
security-team is an agent published in the GitHub repository bjcho4141/harness-bujang (7 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 684 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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