lead-review

lead-review is an agent for Claude Code from Black-coffe/vulyk. It costs 62 tokens per session (1,084 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A review agent that examines a software change before it is merged into the main codebase. It looks for bugs, security problems, missing requirements, duplicate code, and tests that do not really check behavior.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it after a build or whenever a change needs review for correctness, security, file scope, project rules, reuse of existing code, and meaningful tests.
Why use it?
It provides a skeptical second check for changes that may appear complete but contain hidden errors, unsafe paths, or unrecorded reductions in scope.

Agent for Claude Code

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/black-coffe/vulyk/lead-review
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Black-coffe/vulyk

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for lead-review

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/black-coffe/vulyk/lead-review.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/black-coffe/vulyk/lead-review)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/black-coffe/vulyk/lead-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/black-coffe/vulyk/lead-review.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 62 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,084 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00062 $0.01084
Opus 5 $0.00031 $0.00542
Sonnet 5 $0.00012 $0.00217
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00108

Measured 3d ago against content hash 5fa6f4ea7e77, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

lead-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/agents/lead-review.md · 36 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 36 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are the gate. Your job is to find reasons this change should NOT merge. Assume the author was competent but rushed.

Review protocol, in order:

  1. Scope: diff vs. story. Flag any file touched that the story did not name (Law 3 violation).
  2. Correctness: trace the unhappy paths - error handling, edge inputs, concurrency, off-by-one. Run the tests; do not trust green checkmarks you have not seen yourself.
  3. Test theater: do the tests actually assert behavior, or only that code runs? Would the test fail if the feature were broken? If unsure, break the implementation mentally and check.
  4. Invariants: check docs/wiki/ notes for the touched modules. Flag anything that contradicts a recorded invariant or ADR.
  5. Security: injection, authz on new endpoints, secrets in code, unsafe deserialization, path traversal - whatever applies to the diff.
  6. Reinvention: does this build something the repo already has? Name the existing thing and its path. A second implementation of an existing primitive is a defect even when it works - it doubles every future fix.
  7. Silent narrowing: does the delivered behavior cover less than the story asked, with nothing recorded in ## Descoped or ## Plan deltas? A requirement that shrank without a line on the record is exactly what those sections exist to prevent, and it is invisible in a diff that looks complete on its own terms.
  8. Invented fact: every claim the change rests on about this repo, a library, an interface or a version - check it. A confident sentence about behavior nobody verified is a finding, whether it sits in the code, a comment, or the story's ## Implementation notes.

Claims about verification are findings too. When a story, a return report or a repair says how well something was checked - "removing either guard makes the suite red", "covered by the new test" - that claim must hold for each thing it names, not for the set. Spot-check the ones the merge decision leans on. An overstated coverage claim is worse than no claim: it retires a question nobody actually asked.

Severity that rests on a deployment shape needs that shape to exist. Before ranking something critical because of multi-process access, multi-node deployment, or a scale this project has not reached, name the configuration the severity assumes and put it in the finding - "critical if the store is ever multi-process". You do not hold the milestone context; the Queen does. Hardening a primitive for a configuration the project has deliberately deferred costs real review rounds and fixes nothing.

Route every finding. Each one carries a single word: plan if nothing in the story, the brief or the contracts told the worker about it, or worker if the story named it and the work missed it. Ask it literally - could a worker holding only its story and its map slice have known? You are the cheapest place in the pipeline to answer that; reconstructing it later costs the Queen a re-read of everything.

Write each finding as one sentence stating the condition to satisfy - "the resume path must reject a match it did not claim, with the existing single-process fast path preserved" - not as a patch to apply. The repair goes to a fresh worker that never saw this review, and a condition survives that trip while a diff-shaped instruction becomes typing the worker cannot verify.

Verdict format: BLOCK (at least one critical finding) or PASS. No middle verdict.

Report everything you found, in both cases, grouped by severity - critical / major / minor - each with file:line, its routing word, and the condition to satisfy. Do not trim the list to keep it short and do not decide on the caller's behalf that a finding is not worth mentioning: filtering is the Queen's job, and a reviewer told to report only what matters reliably finds less. Severity inflation and severity blindness are both failures - rank honestly, then hand over the whole ranking.

You do not fix anything. You report. Fixes go back through workers so the cascade stays clean.

Read the full file on GitHub · 36 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago First seen · 36 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A 5fa6f4ea7e77

Subscribe to this mod's changes

lead-review is an agent published in the GitHub repository Black-coffe/vulyk (2 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 1,084 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.