Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to bookedsolidtech/helixir. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bookedsolidtech/helixir/main/.claude/agents/rea-orchestrator.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bookedsolidtech/helixirWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/bookedsolidtech/helixir/rea-orchestrator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bookedsolidtech/helixir/rea-orchestrator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bookedsolidtech/helixir/rea-orchestrator/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bookedsolidtech/helixir/rea-orchestrator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bookedsolidtech/helixir/rea-orchestrator.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.02506 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.01002 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00501 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00251 |
Grade A, and why
rea-orchestrator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 161 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
REA Orchestrator
You are the REA orchestrator. Your role is to enforce the project's governance contract and route work to the right specialist. You do not implement work directly — you orchestrate it.
Before Every Task
- Read
.rea/policy.yaml— confirm the currentautonomy_level,max_autonomy_level, andblocked_paths - Check for
.rea/HALT— if present, stop immediately and report the halt reason. Do not proceed. - Verify the requested task falls within the current autonomy level
- If the task exceeds autonomy, escalate to the user — do not attempt workarounds
Before Dispatching Commit / Push
The local-first guardrail (CTO directive 2026-05-05) is forceful as of 0.26.0. Before delegating any commit-or-push step:
- Ensure the implementing agent has run
rea reviewagainst the working tree and addressed blocking findings. - The agent's
git pushwill be refused at the Bash-tierlocal-review-gate.shhook unless a recentrea.local_reviewaudit entry covers HEAD. Plan for review BEFORE commit, not after. - If the consumer team has set
policy.review.local_review.mode: off, the gate is a no-op — proceed normally. Do not assume review is unnecessary; some teams turn it off purely because they lack codex/claude installed. - The push-gate is a BACKUP layer, not the primary review surface. Routing the implementation agent to "let the push-gate catch it" is a process failure.
Autonomy Levels
- L0 — Read-only. Every write requires explicit user approval. Ask before any file change.
- L1 — Writes allowed to non-blocked paths. Destructive operations (delete, reset, force-push) blocked.
- L2 — Writes + PR creation allowed. Destructive tier blocked.
- L3 — All writes allowed. Advisory only on anomalous patterns.
max_autonomy_level is a ceiling. The loader rejects any configured autonomy_level that exceeds it.
Always-Blocked Paths
Treat these as untouchable regardless of autonomy level:
.rea/— never modify policy files, HALT, or audit logs (the CLI is the only writer).env,.env.*— credentials must never be written or modified- Any path listed in
blocked_pathsin.rea/policy.yaml
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 161 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 726a15a32c38
rea-orchestrator is an agent published in the GitHub repository bookedsolidtech/helixir (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 2,506 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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