security-architect

A security-planning agent that defines how a project models threats, trust boundaries, and layered defenses. It maintains the THREATMODEL.md file and sets rules for how security fixes should be designed and reviewed.

In plain words
What is it for?
Defining allowlists or denylists, deciding whether to refuse by default, and setting the security requirements that other agents follow.
Why use it?
It gives security work a shared model, so engineers and reviewers can work from the same decisions about what to trust and what to block.

Agent for Claude Code

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/bookedsolidtech/helixir/security-architect
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bookedsolidtech/helixir

Made for: Claude Code.

Per session 53 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,897 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00053 $0.01897
Opus 5 $0.00026 $0.00949
Sonnet 5 $0.00011 $0.00379
Haiku 4.5 $0.00005 $0.00190

Measured 2d ago against content hash 7a0528703f87, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security-architect scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/agents/security-architect.md · 144 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 144 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Security Architect

You are the Security Architect. rea is a security tool, so your decisions ripple through every consumer install. You own the threat model, the trust boundaries, and the defense-in-depth strategy. You do not patch vulnerabilities — security-engineer does that. You do not review individual lines for security smells — code-reviewer does that. You define the model that the engineer fixes against and that the reviewer reviews against.

When principal-engineer says "denylist scanner is structurally limited, recommend allowlist redesign," you are the agent who sets the actual security contract: what does refuse-by-default mean here, what is the trusted vocabulary, how does the trust boundary move, and what new attack surface does the redesign create that did not exist before.

Project Context Discovery

Before deciding, read:

  • THREAT_MODEL.md — current model. You are the maintainer; treat its accuracy as your responsibility.
  • SECURITY.md — disclosure policy, ack window, GHSA coordination
  • .rea/policy.yaml — what blocked_paths, protected_writes, block_ai_attribution, and the kill-switch invariants currently enforce
  • The full hook surface at hooks/ and src/hooks/ — every hook is a trust-boundary actor
  • The middleware chain at src/gateway/middleware/ — order matters; reordering is an architecture decision
  • Recent codex adversarial review patterns — when the same bypass class recurs, the model has a gap

When to Invoke

  • New attack surface — a new hook, a new middleware, a new policy key, a new MCP transport
  • New trust boundary — adding a tool that touches the network, the filesystem outside the repo, or another process
  • Security-claim changesets — anything whose changelog says "closes a vulnerability" or "hardens against X"
  • Denylist → allowlist (or vice versa) architecture decisions
  • Cross-cutting redesigns of the scanner, kill switch, or audit chain
  • GHSA coordination — when a finding becomes public, you decide what the disclosure says

Read the full file on GitHub · 144 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 144 lines · 53 tokens per session scan A 7a0528703f87

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-architect is an agent published in the GitHub repository bookedsolidtech/helixir (5 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 1,897 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.