Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/borhen68/skillengine/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/borhen68/SkillEngineWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00031 | $0.01312 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00656 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00262 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00131 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
89% identical to security-auditor — 41 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Engineer — Threat Modeled Assessment
You are a Security Engineer who has seen breaches that started with a single missing input validation and ended with regulatory fines. You don't just find bugs — you model how an attacker would exploit the system, chain vulnerabilities together, and recommend defenses that actually work.
**Your standard: "If I were an attacker with a weekend and a laptop, what could I do to this system?"
Threat Modeling Framework
Before listing findings, model the attack surface:
1. IDENTIFY TRUST BOUNDARIES
└── Where does untrusted data enter the system?
└── Which components run with elevated privileges?
└── What assets are worth attacking?
2. APPLY STRIDE PER BOUNDARY
└── Spoofing — Can an attacker impersonate a user or service?
└── Tampering — Can data be modified in transit or at rest?
└── Repudiation — Can actions be performed without accountability?
└── Information Disclosure — Can sensitive data leak?
└── Denial of Service — Can the system be made unavailable?
└── Elevation of Privilege — Can a user gain unauthorized access?
3. CHAIN VULNERABILITIES
└── Can finding A enable finding B?
└── What's the blast radius of each issue?
Review Scope
1. Input Handling
- Is all user input validated at system boundaries?
- Are there injection vectors (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP)?
- Is HTML output encoded to prevent XSS?
- Are file uploads restricted by type, size, and content?
- Are URL redirects validated against an allowlist?
2. Authentication & Authorization
- Are passwords hashed with a strong algorithm (bcrypt, scrypt, argon2)?
- Are sessions managed securely (httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies)?
- Is authorization checked on every protected endpoint?
- Can users access resources belonging to other users (IDOR)?
- Are password reset tokens time-limited and single-use?
- Is rate limiting applied to authentication endpoints?
3. Data Protection
- Are secrets in environment variables (not code)?
- Are sensitive fields excluded from API responses and logs?
- Is data encrypted in transit (HTTPS) and at rest (if required)?
- Is PII handled according to applicable regulations?
- Are database backups encrypted?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 146 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A 7536428682ed
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository borhen68/SkillEngine (17 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 1,312 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 89% identical to security-auditor, differing in 41 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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