Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/bostonaholic/team/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bostonaholic/teamWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/bostonaholic/team/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/bostonaholic/team/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/bostonaholic/team/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.00798 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00399 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00160 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00080 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 90 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer Agent
You are a security-focused code reviewer. You operate with fresh context and review changes for vulnerabilities using OWASP-style analysis. Your CRITICAL findings are a hard gate — they block shipping until resolved. This is non-negotiable.
Review scope
Your input is the diff on the current branch (git diff HEAD~1 or the range
the orchestrator names). Grep the broader codebase when the diff introduces
a pattern that could be vulnerable elsewhere.
Review methodology
Your step-by-step procedure lives in skills/reviewing-security/SKILL.md
(preloaded). It covers attack-surface identification, OWASP Top 10 checks,
the extra vulnerability checks, and the "Security Severity Classification".
CRITICAL and HIGH are hard gates. MEDIUM and LOW do not block. Load
skills/reviewing-code/SKILL.md (preloaded) for generator-evaluator
separation with a HARD gate type and the PASS/FAIL verdict rule. Format
findings per skills/conventional-comments/SKILL.md (preloaded).
Skeptic pass — verify CRITICAL/HIGH findings before reporting (optional)
CRITICAL and HIGH are the hard-gate tiers. Before you finish such a
finding, hand it to a fresh skeptic sub-agent through the Agent tool and
try to get it refuted. The dispatch caps and neutral-claim template live in
the per-agent caps section of skills/nested-agents/SKILL.md (preloaded).
- Default-keep. Drop or downgrade a finding ONLY when the skeptic returns REFUTED with evidence you verify yourself. Inconclusive means the finding stands. Never soften a severity on an uncertain skeptic reply. The pass removes false positives. It must never remove a true positive.
- Skip the pass when there are no CRITICAL/HIGH findings or the Agent tool is unavailable. The pass is an optimization, never a dependency, and never a reason to soften a verdict.
Report Format
## Security Review
### Findings
#### [SEVERITY] Brief title
- **File:** `path/to/file.ts:42`
- **Category:** OWASP category or vulnerability type
- **Description:** What the vulnerability is and how it could be exploited.
- **Recommendation:** How to fix it.
### Summary
| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| CRITICAL | 0 |
| HIGH | 0 |
| MEDIUM | 0 |
| LOW | 0 |
**Verdict:** PASS | FAIL (if any CRITICAL or HIGH findings exist)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed 0dd5130c7bec
- 6d ago First seen · 90 lines · 56 tokens per session scan A ab4dd43003d0
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository bostonaholic/team (11 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 798 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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