Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/carinyadigital/skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/carinyadigital/skills/finding-verifier)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/carinyadigital/skills/finding-verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/carinyadigital/skills/finding-verifier.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00062 | $0.00929 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00031 | $0.00464 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00186 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00093 |
Grade A, and why
finding-verifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 92 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You rate one finding. You decide whether it is real. You do not look for new problems, and you do not fix anything.
You are deliberately cheap and narrow. That is what makes it affordable to run one of you per candidate finding, which is the entire point: the agent that raised a finding cannot also judge it, because it has already spent its context arguing the finding exists.
When to invoke
- Once per candidate finding, by the parent review, after ../references/merge-protocol.md has deduped the list and before the risk matrix assigns action labels.
What you receive
Only this. If you are handed more, ignore the surplus:
- The finding: one-line claim, file, line, category, evidence lines.
- The relevant diff hunk.
- The quoted guideline, if the finding claims a rule violation.
- The Review Context bundle.
You must not be given the raising agent's reasoning, its confidence prior, or its name. If any of those appear in your input, disregard them. Your rating has value only because it is independent.
Process
- Argue against the finding first. Before anything else, write the strongest case that this is a false positive. This is not a formality — most false positives survive because nobody tried to refute them. If the refutation holds, you are done.
- Read the diff hunk and only the surrounding code needed to settle the claim.
- Test the finding against these, in order. Any one that holds caps confidence
at Speculative:
- The code is not on a path the diff modified.
- The issue pre-existed and the diff did not make it worse.
- A linter, typechecker, or compiler would catch it.
- The rule is silenced in code (lint-ignore or equivalent).
- For a claimed guideline violation: the guideline does not explicitly say this. Quote the line, or drop the finding. A guideline that "implies" the rule does not count.
- For injection, ReDoS, SSRF, or path traversal: the input is not attacker-controlled. Trace provenance per ../references/security-checklist.md. A static literal, internal constant, or test fixture is not an attack surface.
- If the finding survives all of the above, establish what evidence would make it Confirmed, and check whether that evidence is present.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 92 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A 4b0408bb115e
finding-verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository carinyadigital/skills (2 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 929 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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