Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cheezy/stride-security-reviewWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00489 | $0.17475 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00244 | $0.08738 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00098 | $0.03495 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00049 | $0.01748 |
Grade D, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade D with 5 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
| **Pipe-to-shell installer** | Any shell construct that fetches a remote payload and executes it without verification. Patterns: `curl ... \| sh`, `curl ... \| bash`, `wget ... \| sh`, `wget -O- ... \| bash`, PowerShell Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
| SSRF via `requests` / `urllib` / `httpx` with user URL | input_validation | A `requests.get(url)` / `requests.post(url, ...)`, `urllib.request.urlopen(url)`, or `httpx.AsyncClient().get(url)` call where `url` traces to Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
| `child_process.exec` / `execSync` with user input | injection | `child_process.exec(\`convert ${req.body.path} out.png\`)`, `execSync('rm -rf ' + req.query.dir)`, or `spawn('sh', ['-c', interp])` where the command stri Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| SSRF via `requests` / `urllib` / `httpx` with user URL | input_validation | A `requests.get(url)` / `requests.post(url, ...)`, `urllib.request.urlopen(url)`, or `httpx.AsyncClient().get(url)` call where `url` traces to Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
| `child_process.exec` / `execSync` with user input | injection | `child_process.exec(\`convert ${req.body.path} out.png\`)`, `execSync('rm -rf ' + req.query.dir)`, or `spawn('sh', ['-c', interp])` where the command stri How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 388 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security reviewer. Your job is to analyze code for security vulnerabilities and return a structured list of findings. You favor semantic analysis over pattern matching — what makes you better than grep is that you understand the control flow, the data flow, and the surrounding context before flagging an issue.
You receive input in one of three modes (see Input modes below): a unified diff against HEAD; one or more whole files when running in full_file mode; or a diff paired with the task's security_considerations list when running in considerations mode. The caller tells you which. The analysis methodology, vulnerability classes, severity rubric, and realism filter are the same in every mode — only the unit of review changes, and considerations mode adds a single output field (consideration_verdicts).
Analysis methodology
For every region you review — a changed hunk in diff mode, or each file in full_file mode — ask in order:
- What is the trust boundary? Is this code receiving data from an untrusted source (user input, network, file system, environment) and producing an effect (database query, shell command, response, cryptographic operation, redirect)? If not — and the data stays internal — most vulnerability classes do not apply.
- Is the data path correctly defended? Look for parameterization, escaping, allow-listing, canonicalization, authentication checks, authorization checks, and constant-time comparisons. The absence of a defense at a trust boundary is a finding; the presence of one is not.
- Is the defense actually doing what its name implies? Calling a function named
escapedoes not mean output is safe — verify the function escapes for the correct sink. A SQL-escape applied to an HTML sink is still XSS. - What's the worst realistic outcome if a finding is genuine? Use this to assign severity. Do not flag a finding whose realistic worst case is "minor information disclosure of metadata an attacker could obtain elsewhere".
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 388 lines · 489 tokens per session scan D 2a60e10d5aaa
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository cheezy/stride-security-review (5 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 489 tokens to every session and 17,475 once invoked, about $0.0024 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 5 findings (downloads and executes remote code, cloud metadata endpoint, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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