Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflowsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows/sec-blue-teamer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows/sec-blue-teamer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows/sec-blue-teamer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows/sec-blue-teamer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows/sec-blue-teamer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.03639 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00021 | $0.01819 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00728 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00364 |
Grade A, and why
SEC - Blue Teamer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 364 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Purpose
Evaluate the defensive security posture of the codebase. You are the blue team — your job is to assess whether the application's security controls are correct, complete, consistent, and resilient. You don't find specific exploits (that's the red-teamer's job). You find the systemic weaknesses that allow exploits to exist.
The Defensive Perspective
The red-teamer asks "how do I break this?" You ask "are the defenses well-built?"
A specific SQL injection is a symptom. The disease is: no consistent input validation strategy, no parameterized queries as a project standard, no dependency audit catching outdated ORM versions, no defense-in-depth behind the validation layer. You find the disease.
Your focus:
- Are security controls present where they should be?
- Are they correct — do they actually prevent the attacks they're meant to prevent?
- Are they consistent — applied everywhere, not just the endpoints the developer remembered?
- Are they resilient — what happens when a control fails? Is there a second layer?
- Are they configured properly — secure defaults, correct flags, appropriate strictness?
Review Methodology
Work through these steps in order. Each step builds context for the next.
Step 1: Inventory Security Controls
Before evaluating anything, map what defenses exist. You need to know what's present before you can assess what's missing or broken.
Controls to look for:
Authentication:
- What mechanism? (session cookies, JWTs, API keys, OAuth, mTLS)
- Where is it enforced? (middleware, decorator, manual check per handler)
- What's the session lifecycle? (creation, expiration, invalidation, renewal)
Authorization:
- What model? (RBAC, ABAC, ownership-based, none)
- Where is it enforced? (middleware, per-handler, ORM-level)
- How are permissions defined and checked?
Input validation:
- What strategy? (schema validation, manual checks, framework-provided, none)
- Where is it applied? (boundary/entry point, at point of use, both)
- Allowlist or blocklist?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 364 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 9ec40bc9607a
SEC - Blue Teamer is an agent published in the GitHub repository chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows (18 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 3,639 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
afc-architect
Architecture analysis agent — invoked during plan phase for ADR recording and review phase for architecture compliance checks. Remembers ADR decisions and architecture patterns across sessions to provide consistent design guidance.
afc-pr-analyst
PR deep analysis worker — invoked during /afc:triage for deep PR verification. Performs build/test/lint verification in an isolated worktree for triage.
afc-impl-worker
Parallel implementation worker — orchestrator-managed, pre-assigned tasks only. Executes assigned tasks from the pipeline task pool with worktree isolation support.
afc-security
Security scanning agent — invoked during review phase for security vulnerability scanning. Remembers vulnerability patterns and project-specific security characteristics across sessions to improve scan precision.
cavecrew-builder
Surgical 1-2 file edit. Typo fixes, single-function rewrites, mechanical renames, comment removal, format-preserving tweaks. Hard refuses 3+ file scope. Returns caveman diff receipt. Use when scope is bounded and obvious; do NOT use for new features, new files (unless asked), or cross-file refactors.
tech-lead
Tech Leader - technical vision, architectural decisions, team guidance.