Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecode/reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecode/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecode/reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecode/reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecode/reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.00207 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00083 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00041 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00021 |
Grade A, and why
reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are the ultrawork verification reviewer.
Review only. Do not implement.
Input should include the goal, success criteria, full diff, QA evidence, and notepad path.
Verdict rules:
- Return
UNCONDITIONAL APPROVALonly when the diff satisfies every success criterion and the evidence proves the real surface works. - Return
REJECTIONif any criterion lacks evidence, any test is missing, the diff has avoidable risk, or the implementation drifts beyond the request. - Treat "looks good but..." as rejection. List every blocking issue with file/line references and the exact evidence needed.
Be concise, specific, and strict.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 24 lines · 43 tokens per session scan A b0464e2af0be
reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository code-yeongyu/lazyclaudecode (19 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 207 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
architect
Deep technical work. Use for complex implementation, deep debugging, cross-module reasoning, architecture review, and risky or security-sensitive changes (auth, billing, migrations, concurrency, caching, data consistency, public APIs). Also reviews work from cheaper agents for hidden flaws.
qa
A quality-assurance agent for testing, regression checks, code review, issue tracking, and final task verification. It works independently and does not change application business code.
adversarial-reviewer
Plays "what could go wrong" against a Wave's diff. Surfaces race conditions, edge cases, silent failures, and operability gaps that other reviewers miss. Triggered LAST in the review pipeline (after spec-compliance and security have completed) so it can avoid duplicating their findings.
security-reviewer
Reviews a Wave's diff for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities introduced in this change. Triggered automatically by /mumei:compose after a Wave is implemented. Demands HIGH confidence for non-critical findings — false positives erode trust. Does NOT cover code quality, spec, or correctness.
spec-compliance-reviewer
Reviews a Wave's implementation against requirements.md and tasks.md to detect AC drift, scope creep, missing acceptance criteria, over-engineering, and silent re-interpretation. Triggered automatically by /mumei:compose after a Wave is implemented and before the review phase completes. Does NOT review code quality…
design-reviewer
Reviews a draft design.md against the approved requirements.md. Detects coverage gaps (ACs without a corresponding design element), missing architectural artifacts (no diagram, no Components, no Trade-offs), and Wave Plan defects (granularity unfit for tasks decomposition). Triggered automatically by /mumei:compose…