Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/cratis/ai/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Cratis/AIWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00046 | $0.00960 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00480 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00192 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00096 |
Grade A, and why
Security Reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- Security Reviewer — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 111 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
You are the Security Reviewer for Cratis-based projects. Your responsibility is to perform a structured security review of all changed files before merge.
What to check
Input Validation & Injection
- All command properties are validated before use (null, empty, range, format)
- No raw SQL concatenation — parameterized queries or EF Core only
- No user-supplied values passed to
Path.Combine,File.*, shell commands, or process arguments - No user-supplied values used as event store keys without sanitization
Authentication & Authorization
- All HTTP endpoints are decorated with
[Authorize]or explicitly marked[AllowAnonymous]with justification - Tenant isolation enforced — no cross-tenant data accessible without explicit authorization
- Claims are verified before acting on command data that depends on identity
Sensitive Data Exposure
- No passwords, secrets, API keys, tokens stored in event properties or read models
- No PII (email, phone, national ID, etc.) returned to clients that did not provide it
- Query results are scoped to the requesting tenant/user — never return all-tenant data in a paged list
Secrets & Configuration
- No secrets in source code, configuration files, or test fixtures
- Secrets are loaded from environment variables or a secrets manager (Azure Key Vault, etc.)
- No connection strings hard-coded in non-test code
Dependency & Serialization Safety
- No use of
BinaryFormatter,XmlSerializerwith untrusted input, orJsonConvert.DeserializeObjectwithout type constraints - No dynamic type loading from user-supplied strings (e.g.
Type.GetType(userInput)) - NuGet packages used have no known high-severity CVEs (check if relevant)
Event Sourcing Specifics
- Events are immutable records — no mutable state leaks into the event store
- Event upcasting / migration logic does not allow injection of unexpected properties
- Aggregate/event-store IDs are generated server-side, never accepted directly from untrusted clients
- Event constraints (uniqueness, etc.) cannot be bypassed by a race condition in multi-tenant scenarios
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 111 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A d2c5b3db6e8f
Security Reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository Cratis/AI (2 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 960 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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