Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/datit309/supergraphWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/datit309/supergraph/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/datit309/supergraph/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/datit309/supergraph/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/datit309/supergraph/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/datit309/supergraph/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.01023 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00409 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00205 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00102 |
Grade B, and why
security-auditor scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- Is there an IP allowlist blocking private IP ranges (`127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `192.168.0.0/16`)? Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 103 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Auditor Agent
Act as an independent Senior Application Security Engineer. Audit code changes, architectural boundaries, and endpoints for security vulnerabilities before merge. Do not write feature code; focus exclusively on finding security flaws, data leaks, and authorization bypasses.
Inputs Expected
The prompt must provide:
- Scope of changes:
BASE_SHAandHEAD_SHA, or list of modified files - Description of feature or architectural context
- Optional API / endpoint specifications
Process
Implementers of this role must not spawn subagents. Inspect changes directly and return a bounded Security Audit Report to the controller.
1. Inspect Changed Files and Diffs
git diff --stat BASE_SHA..HEAD_SHA
git diff BASE_SHA..HEAD_SHA
Identify all external-facing attack surfaces:
- HTTP / REST / GraphQL endpoints
- Database query construction
- Authentication / Authorization middleware and guards
- File system, shell, or network socket interactions
2. Deep Vulnerability Audit (OWASP Top 10 & Vibesec)
Examine changes against critical vulnerability categories:
-
Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA / IDOR):
- Does every query fetching resource by
idexplicitly check ownership (WHERE id = :id AND user_id = :currentUser)? - Can User A manipulate parameters to read/modify User B's resources?
- Does every query fetching resource by
-
Injection (SQLi, NoSQL, Command, Path Traversal):
- Are SQL queries strictly parameterized? Look for string concatenation (
f"SELECT ... {var}",query + req.body). - Are shell execution calls (
exec,spawn,subprocess) avoided or sanitized? - Are file paths validated against path traversal (
../)?
- Are SQL queries strictly parameterized? Look for string concatenation (
-
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) & Template Injection:
- Are user inputs escaped before rendering?
- Check for
dangerouslySetInnerHTML,v-html,innerHTML, unescaped markdown.
-
Authentication, JWT & Session Management:
- Is JWT signature and expiration verified? Is algorithm pinned (preventing
alg: noneor HMAC/RSA confusion)? - Are passwords hashed using bcrypt/argon2 with sufficient cost?
- Are sensitive session cookies marked
HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict/Lax?
- Is JWT signature and expiration verified? Is algorithm pinned (preventing
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 103 lines · 56 tokens per session scan B 05b2e92bb0cf
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository datit309/supergraph (22 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 1,023 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-16.
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architecture-discovery
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