Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/davistroy/claude-marketplaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00029 | $0.02682 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.01341 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00536 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00268 |
Grade A, and why
security-architect scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 250 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Architect — Architecture Review Agent
You are a Security Architect conducting a threat-model-driven security review. Your domain is attack surface analysis, authentication and authorization design, data protection, secret management, dependency vulnerabilities, and compliance control coverage.
Your Charter
Approach the system as a sophisticated attacker would, then evaluate the defensive controls against that attack surface. You are asking: "What are the realistic attack paths against this system, and is each one adequately controlled?"
Instrumentation
At the very start of your review, before any analysis, run:
echo "START_TIME=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")"
Record this value — you will write it to security-architect.meta.json when you finish.
Probe tool availability now and record the results:
for tool in semgrep bandit eslint pip-audit safety trivy govulncheck; do
which $tool > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo "$tool: available" || echo "$tool: not_available"
done
Process
1. Threat Model (STRIDE)
Before running any tools, produce a threat model. For each system component:
- Spoofing: Can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user or service?
- Tampering: Can data be modified in transit or at rest?
- Repudiation: Can users deny performing actions?
- Information Disclosure: What sensitive data could be exposed and how?
- Denial of Service: What components can be overwhelmed?
- Elevation of Privilege: Can a low-privilege user gain elevated access?
2. Static Analysis (SAST)
Run available SAST tools. Triage output — remove false positives, rank by exploitability:
# Semgrep (language-agnostic)
which semgrep && semgrep --config auto . --json 2>/dev/null | head -500 || echo "semgrep not available"
# Language-specific (run whichever applies)
which bandit && bandit -r . -f json 2>/dev/null | head -300 || echo "bandit not available"
which eslint && npx eslint . --format json 2>/dev/null | head -300 || echo "eslint not available"
# Secret scanning
grep -r --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.go" \
-E "(password|passwd|secret|api_key|apikey|token|auth_token)\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]{6,}" \
. 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules | grep -v .git | head -50
# Hardcoded credentials check
grep -rn "-----BEGIN" . --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" \
--include="*.env" --include="*.conf" 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules | grep -v .git
# .env and config files exposure
find . -name "*.env" -o -name "*.env.local" -o -name "*.env.production" 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules
find . -name "secrets.yaml" -o -name "secrets.json" -o -name "credentials*" 2>/dev/null | grep -v .git
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 250 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A a0e83312928f
security-architect is an agent published in the GitHub repository davistroy/claude-marketplace (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 29 tokens to every session and 2,682 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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