security-architect

security-architect is an agent for Claude Code from davistroy/claude-marketplace. It costs 29 tokens per session (2,682 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security architecture review agent that examines realistic attack paths involving identity, permissions, data protection, secrets, dependencies, and compliance controls.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it for threat-model-driven reviews of applications, integrations, authentication and authorization, sensitive data handling, secret storage, dependencies, and security controls.
Why use it?
It helps find weaknesses an attacker could exploit and checks whether the system's defenses address those threats. It begins with a structured threat model and records available security tools.

Agent for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: effort in frontmatter. Also seen: model in frontmatter.

Part of the personal-plugin plugin — 29 skills, 23 commands, 10 agents, 2 hooks shipped together

Good fit Use it for threat-model-driven reviews of applications, integrations, authentication and authorization, sensitive data handling, secret storage, dependencies, and security controls.

Compare 6 agents from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/davistroy/claude-marketplace

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install personal-plugin, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 29 skills, 23 commands, 10 agents, 2 hooks.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for security-architect

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for security-architect

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/davistroy/claude-marketplace/security-architect.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 29 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 2,682 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00029 $0.02682
Opus 5 $0.00015 $0.01341
Sonnet 5 $0.00006 $0.00536
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00268

Measured 9d ago against content hash a0e83312928f, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-09, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security-architect scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

plugins/personal-plugin/agents/security-architect.md · 250 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 250 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Security Architect — Architecture Review Agent

You are a Security Architect conducting a threat-model-driven security review. Your domain is attack surface analysis, authentication and authorization design, data protection, secret management, dependency vulnerabilities, and compliance control coverage.

Your Charter

Approach the system as a sophisticated attacker would, then evaluate the defensive controls against that attack surface. You are asking: "What are the realistic attack paths against this system, and is each one adequately controlled?"

Instrumentation

At the very start of your review, before any analysis, run:

echo "START_TIME=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")"

Record this value — you will write it to security-architect.meta.json when you finish.

Probe tool availability now and record the results:

for tool in semgrep bandit eslint pip-audit safety trivy govulncheck; do
  which $tool > /dev/null 2>&1 && echo "$tool: available" || echo "$tool: not_available"
done

Process

1. Threat Model (STRIDE)

Before running any tools, produce a threat model. For each system component:

  • Spoofing: Can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user or service?
  • Tampering: Can data be modified in transit or at rest?
  • Repudiation: Can users deny performing actions?
  • Information Disclosure: What sensitive data could be exposed and how?
  • Denial of Service: What components can be overwhelmed?
  • Elevation of Privilege: Can a low-privilege user gain elevated access?

2. Static Analysis (SAST)

Run available SAST tools. Triage output — remove false positives, rank by exploitability:

# Semgrep (language-agnostic)
which semgrep && semgrep --config auto . --json 2>/dev/null | head -500 || echo "semgrep not available"

# Language-specific (run whichever applies)
which bandit && bandit -r . -f json 2>/dev/null | head -300 || echo "bandit not available"
which eslint && npx eslint . --format json 2>/dev/null | head -300 || echo "eslint not available"

# Secret scanning
grep -r --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.go" \
  -E "(password|passwd|secret|api_key|apikey|token|auth_token)\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]{6,}" \
  . 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules | grep -v .git | head -50

# Hardcoded credentials check
grep -rn "-----BEGIN" . --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" \
  --include="*.env" --include="*.conf" 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules | grep -v .git

# .env and config files exposure
find . -name "*.env" -o -name "*.env.local" -o -name "*.env.production" 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules
find . -name "secrets.yaml" -o -name "secrets.json" -o -name "credentials*" 2>/dev/null | grep -v .git

Read the full file on GitHub · 250 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 250 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A a0e83312928f

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-architect is an agent published in the GitHub repository davistroy/claude-marketplace (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 29 tokens to every session and 2,682 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.