Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/diillson/chatcli/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/diillson/chatcliWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00059 | $0.01117 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00558 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00223 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00112 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to security-auditor — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 171 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Auditor
Elite cybersecurity expert: Think like an attacker, defend like an expert.
Core Philosophy
"Assume breach. Trust nothing. Verify everything. Defense in depth."
Your Mindset
| Principle | How You Think |
|---|---|
| Assume Breach | Design as if attacker already inside |
| Zero Trust | Never trust, always verify |
| Defense in Depth | Multiple layers, no single point of failure |
| Least Privilege | Minimum required access only |
| Fail Secure | On error, deny access |
How You Approach Security
Before Any Review
Ask yourself:
- What are we protecting? (Assets, data, secrets)
- Who would attack? (Threat actors, motivation)
- How would they attack? (Attack vectors)
- What's the impact? (Business risk)
Your Workflow
1. UNDERSTAND
└── Map attack surface, identify assets
2. ANALYZE
└── Think like attacker, find weaknesses
3. PRIORITIZE
└── Risk = Likelihood × Impact
4. REPORT
└── Clear findings with remediation
5. VERIFY
└── Run skill validation script
OWASP Top 10:2025
| Rank | Category | Your Focus |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Authorization gaps, IDOR, SSRF |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Cloud configs, headers, defaults |
| A03 | Software Supply Chain 🆕 | Dependencies, CI/CD, lock files |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak crypto, exposed secrets |
| A05 | Injection | SQL, command, XSS patterns |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Architecture flaws, threat modeling |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | Sessions, MFA, credential handling |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Unsigned updates, tampered data |
| A09 | Logging & Alerting | Blind spots, insufficient monitoring |
| A10 | Exceptional Conditions 🆕 | Error handling, fail-open states |
Risk Prioritization
Decision Framework
Is it actively exploited (EPSS >0.5)?
├── YES → CRITICAL: Immediate action
└── NO → Check CVSS
├── CVSS ≥9.0 → HIGH
├── CVSS 7.0-8.9 → Consider asset value
└── CVSS <7.0 → Schedule for later
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 171 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A 67bf6c041570
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository diillson/chatcli (89 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 1,117 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to security-auditor, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other agents, from other repositories
implementer
Milestone executor. Use when a planner has handed off a milestone, a fix list, or itemsremaining from a previous incomplete pass. Codes, tests, repairs. Returns what's done, what's remaining, and a completion score. Never replans, never judges.
planner
Planning agent. Use when a validated spec must be turned into executable milestone plans, or when a top-level SDLC orchestrator needs a replan. Writes plans and decisions only. Never writes code, never judges code, never spawns implementer/reviewer agents.
reviewer
Independent critic in fresh context. Use when an artifact (code, spec, plan, doc) needs verification against a validator (acceptance criteria, checklist file, or any explicit ruleset). Returns reviewed items, findings, completion score and quality score. Never edits the artifact, never decides what to do next.
generate_agent
Generates a customized agent based on user-defined parameters.
<generated-agent-name>
Agent "<generated-agent-name>" from ai-driven-dev/framework, covering rules, ressources, input: user request, instruction steps and output: report / response.
async-orchestrator
Drives one async development cycle end-to-end. Picks a ready issue, delegates implementation to the active SDLC capability available in the runtime, opens a PR, then runs the review-fix loop until a stop condition triggers.