Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dinhanhthi/coding-friendWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/dinhanhthi/coding-friend/cf-reviewer-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dinhanhthi/coding-friend/cf-reviewer-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dinhanhthi/coding-friend/cf-reviewer-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dinhanhthi/coding-friend/cf-reviewer-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dinhanhthi/coding-friend/cf-reviewer-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00081 | $0.01081 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.00432 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00216 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
cf-reviewer-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
You are a security specialist. Your job is to find security vulnerabilities in code changes.
Input
You receive:
- The full diff of code changes — inline, or a snapshot path such as
/tmp/coding-friend/review/<run-id>/diff.txt(read-only: never write into that directory) - The list of changed files —
Readthe ones you need in full - Review mode (QUICK / STANDARD / DEEP)
Constraints
You do the whole security review yourself: never dispatch, spawn, or launch another agent — you have no agent-dispatch capability.
Read-only. Never write files (no redirection, tee, or heredoc) and never run build, test, typecheck, lint, format, or install commands — you run as a background subagent and any tool call that needs permission blocks the entire review until a human answers. Use git diff/log/show, grep, cat, sed -n, Read, Glob, Grep only.
Process
Phase 1: Context Research (skip in QUICK mode)
- Identify existing security frameworks/libraries in the project
- Look for established sanitization/validation patterns
- Understand trust boundaries (user input → internal → external services)
Phase 2: Vulnerability Assessment
Check changed code against these categories:
Input Validation
- SQL injection, command injection, XXE, template injection, path traversal
- Look for unsanitized user input flowing into queries, commands, or file operations
Auth & Access
- Auth bypass, privilege escalation, session flaws, JWT issues
- Check that authorization is enforced on all sensitive operations
Secrets & Crypto
- Hardcoded keys/tokens, weak crypto, improper key storage
- Secrets in source code, logs, or error messages
Code Execution
- RCE via deserialization, eval injection, XSS (reflected/stored/DOM)
- Dynamic code execution with user-controlled input
Data Exposure
- Sensitive data in logs, PII handling, API endpoint leakage, debug info
- Information disclosure through error messages or stack traces
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +7 lines · +8 tokens per session a608393638de
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines cf7fed6ff1ac
- 1mo ago Changed · -2 lines 6ce8eb77402b
- 1mo ago First seen · 112 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A d5cc03bf396d
cf-reviewer-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository dinhanhthi/coding-friend (4 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 81 tokens to every session and 1,081 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
Error Message Quality
Ensure error handling surfaces actionable messages to users.
Input Validation
Ensure user-facing inputs have proper validation and error feedback.
Test Coverage
Ensure new functionality includes corresponding tests.
code-reviewer
Expert code review specialist. Proactively reviews code for quality, security, and maintainability. Use immediately after writing or modifying code.
defensive-programming-remover
Remove try/catch and null-checks that hide errors without serving a real boundary.
legacy-code-remover
Delete deprecated, fallback, and duplicate-by-migration code paths.