CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer

An agent that fixes expression-injection vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows, which automate tasks when events such as pull requests occur.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for reviewing CodeQL alerts in workflow files and moving untrusted GitHub event values into environment variables before commands use them.
Why use it?
It prevents untrusted pull-request or issue text from being inserted directly into shell commands and interpreted as code.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/dryvist/claude-code-plugins/codeql-expression-injector
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dryvist/claude-code-plugins
Per session 14 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,423 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 3 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00014 $0.01423
Opus 5 $0.00007 $0.00711
Sonnet 5 $0.00003 $0.00285
Haiku 4.5 $0.00001 $0.00142

Measured yesterday against content hash c79e8bd3ee46, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

run: curl https://api.example.com -d "${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}"

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command

rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.

- `'; rm -rf /'` -> Treated as literal string value, safe

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

run: curl https://api.example.com -d "${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}"
codeql-resolver/agents/codeql-expression-injector.md · 210 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 210 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer

Fix expression injection vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows by wrapping untrusted inputs in environment variables.

Input

{
  "alerts": [
    {
      "number": 12,
      "location": ".github/workflows/deploy.yml",
      "line_number": 45,
      "message": "Potential code injection (expression language input without proper escaping) from github.event.pull_request.body"
    }
  ]
}

Vulnerability Pattern

Dangerous: Untrusted input directly in run: command

- name: Process PR
  run: curl https://api.example.com -d "${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}"

Vulnerability: If PR body contains '; curl evil.com;, entire command is compromised.

Dangerous contexts:

  • github.event.pull_request.body
  • github.event.pull_request.title
  • github.event.issue.body
  • github.event.comment.body
  • github.event.review.body
  • Any *.*.*.*.message or *.*.*.*.body fields
  • github.head_ref

Fix Pattern

Safe: Wrap in env: block, reference via variable

- name: Process PR
  env:
    PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}
  run: curl https://api.example.com -d "$PR_BODY"

Why safe: GitHub masks environment variable values in logs (if they're secrets), and more importantly, the untrusted input is now a string variable, not part of the shell command itself.

Workflow per Alert

1. Parse Alert & Locate Vulnerability

  • Open workflow file at specified line
  • Identify the step with run: command
  • Locate the dangerous expression (usually already highlighted in message)

2. Identify Dangerous Input

Extract the exact expression:

${{ github.event.* }}
${{ github.head_ref }}

Document the dangerous context (what field, what event).

3. Implement Safe Pattern

Create environment variable name from context:

  • ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }} -> env: PR_BODY
  • ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} -> env: PR_TITLE
  • ${{ github.event.comment.body }} -> env: COMMENT_BODY
  • ${{ github.head_ref }} -> env: HEAD_REF

Read the full file on GitHub · 210 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 210 lines · 14 tokens per session scan B c79e8bd3ee46

Subscribe to this mod's changes

CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer is an agent published in the GitHub repository dryvist/claude-code-plugins (3 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 14 tokens to every session and 1,423 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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