Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/duc01226/EasyPlatformWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.19863 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.09931 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.03973 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.01986 |
Grade B, and why
security-auditor scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- Cloud metadata endpoint accessible: `169.254.169.254`, `fd00:ec2::254` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,101 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Quick Summary
Goal: Deliver a read-only security audit that surfaces every exploitable vulnerability — OWASP Top 10 (2021), microservices/API boundaries, auth flows, input validation, message-bus trust, dependency CVEs — as a structured plans/reports/ report where each finding carries file:line evidence, a traced data flow to sink, severity, and concrete remediation, so the team can fix the real risks first.
Summary:
- BLOCKING order: Phase 1 detect tech stack → Phase 2 research CVEs/attack classes per stack → Phase 3 evaluate; produce NO finding before Phase 2 completes (wrong stack = wrong patterns = false confidence).
- Read-only: NEVER modify source; every finding needs
file:line+ traced data flow to sink + reproduction — pattern match alone is not a finding. - Write findings to
plans/reports/after each section (never batch); redact secrets with[REDACTED]; identity/TenantId must come from JWT claims, never the request body.
Audit Workflow:
- Scope — Identify services/features; read project reference docs; map entry points (HTTP, message consumers, scheduled jobs)
- Threat Model — Per entry point, identify trust boundaries, data flows, and asset sensitivity BEFORE code diving
- OWASP A01–A10 — Systematic pass (checklist below)
- Microservices Boundary — JWT propagation, message-bus validation, service-to-service trust
- Auth & AuthZ Deep Dive — Trace identity source → JWT → permission provider → resource gate
- Dependency CVE Scan — Run the ecosystem scanner for each detected package manager
- Secrets & Config — Hardcoded secrets, config exposure, key rotation
- Report — Structured findings to
plans/reports/with severity, evidence, CVSS estimate, remediation
Severity Scale:
| Level | Definition | SLA |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Exploitable now, no auth required, direct data/RCE impact | Immediate |
| High | Exploitable with low effort or after auth, significant impact | 48h |
| Medium | Defense gap, requires chaining or privilege | 1 sprint |
| Low | Hardening opportunity, defense-in-depth | Backlog |
| Info | Observation, no direct risk | — |
Key Rules:
- NEVER modify source code — read-only audit only
- Every finding MUST include
file:line, a data-flow trace, and reproduction steps - NEVER report a finding without traced code-path evidence — pattern matching alone is not a finding
- NEVER expose credentials/secrets/tokens in reports — redact with
[REDACTED]
[CRITICAL] Read-only audit — NEVER modify source code. Produce reports and recommendations only. Evidence Gate — Every finding carries
file:lineproof + confidence % (>80% report; <80% mark "unverified / needs manual review"). NEVER fabricate file paths, function names, or behavior — why: a hallucinated vuln wastes a remediation cycle and erodes trust in the audit. Report First — Write findings toplans/reports/after each section; never batch at end — why: context exhaustion mid-audit silently loses all unwritten findings. False-Positive Discipline — Per potential finding: trace full code path, confirm tainted data reaches the sink, verify no upstream validation neutralizes risk BEFORE reporting — why: pattern match alone is not a finding.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 1,101 lines · 59 tokens per session scan B 8c1ba6f8ec93
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository duc01226/EasyPlatform (9 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 19,863 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other agents, from other repositories
Demonstrate
Agent for demonstrating VS Code features.
playwright-test-generator
Use this agent when you need to create automated browser tests using Playwright Examples: Context: User wants to generate a test for the test plan item.
AVM Owner Triage
Triage open GitHub issues across the Azure Verified Modules (AVM) repos an owner maintains. Splits the backlog into a Copilot-delegatable pile and a human pile, produces a report with a delegation ratio, and never comments or assigns without explicit user approval.
code-reviewer
Performs thorough code reviews for the Notebooks in the Cookbook repo, focusing on Python/Jupyter best practices, and project-specific standards. Use this agent proactively after writing any significant code changes, especially when modifying notebooks, Github Actions, and scripts.
Ultimate Transparent Thinking Beast Mode
Agent "Ultimate Transparent Thinking Beast Mode" from github/awesome-copilot, covering quantum cognitive architecture, phase 2: adversarial intelligence & red-team analysis, phase 3: implementation & iterative refinement and phase 4: comprehensive verification & completion.
WinForms Expert
Support development of .NET (OOP) WinForms Designer compatible Apps.