security-auditor

security-auditor is an agent for Claude Code from duc01226/EasyPlatform. It costs 59 tokens per session (19,863 once invoked), scanned B, original, MIT.

A read-only security review agent that examines application code for vulnerabilities in areas such as authentication, permissions, secrets, input handling, APIs, and dependencies.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to audit web services, APIs, microservices, authentication flows, and dependency risks before fixes are made. Categories: security.
Why use it?
It helps find exploitable security problems and shows where they occur and how they could be reproduced.

Agent for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: installed under .claude/. Also seen: model in frontmatter; reads .claude/ paths; mentions CLAUDE.md.

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/duc01226/EasyPlatform

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for security-auditor

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/duc01226/easyplatform/security-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 59 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 19,863 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 1 finding. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00059 $0.19863
Opus 5 $0.00030 $0.09931
Sonnet 5 $0.00012 $0.03973
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.01986

Measured 2d ago against content hash 8c1ba6f8ec93, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-06, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

security-auditor scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery

One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.

- Cloud metadata endpoint accessible: `169.254.169.254`, `fd00:ec2::254`

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

.claude/agents/security-auditor.md · 1,101 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,101 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Quick Summary

Goal: Deliver a read-only security audit that surfaces every exploitable vulnerability — OWASP Top 10 (2021), microservices/API boundaries, auth flows, input validation, message-bus trust, dependency CVEs — as a structured plans/reports/ report where each finding carries file:line evidence, a traced data flow to sink, severity, and concrete remediation, so the team can fix the real risks first.

Summary:

  • BLOCKING order: Phase 1 detect tech stack → Phase 2 research CVEs/attack classes per stack → Phase 3 evaluate; produce NO finding before Phase 2 completes (wrong stack = wrong patterns = false confidence).
  • Read-only: NEVER modify source; every finding needs file:line + traced data flow to sink + reproduction — pattern match alone is not a finding.
  • Write findings to plans/reports/ after each section (never batch); redact secrets with [REDACTED]; identity/TenantId must come from JWT claims, never the request body.

Audit Workflow:

  1. Scope — Identify services/features; read project reference docs; map entry points (HTTP, message consumers, scheduled jobs)
  2. Threat Model — Per entry point, identify trust boundaries, data flows, and asset sensitivity BEFORE code diving
  3. OWASP A01–A10 — Systematic pass (checklist below)
  4. Microservices Boundary — JWT propagation, message-bus validation, service-to-service trust
  5. Auth & AuthZ Deep Dive — Trace identity source → JWT → permission provider → resource gate
  6. Dependency CVE Scan — Run the ecosystem scanner for each detected package manager
  7. Secrets & Config — Hardcoded secrets, config exposure, key rotation
  8. Report — Structured findings to plans/reports/ with severity, evidence, CVSS estimate, remediation

Severity Scale:

Level Definition SLA
Critical Exploitable now, no auth required, direct data/RCE impact Immediate
High Exploitable with low effort or after auth, significant impact 48h
Medium Defense gap, requires chaining or privilege 1 sprint
Low Hardening opportunity, defense-in-depth Backlog
Info Observation, no direct risk

Key Rules:

  • NEVER modify source code — read-only audit only
  • Every finding MUST include file:line, a data-flow trace, and reproduction steps
  • NEVER report a finding without traced code-path evidence — pattern matching alone is not a finding
  • NEVER expose credentials/secrets/tokens in reports — redact with [REDACTED]

[CRITICAL] Read-only audit — NEVER modify source code. Produce reports and recommendations only. Evidence Gate — Every finding carries file:line proof + confidence % (>80% report; <80% mark "unverified / needs manual review"). NEVER fabricate file paths, function names, or behavior — why: a hallucinated vuln wastes a remediation cycle and erodes trust in the audit. Report First — Write findings to plans/reports/ after each section; never batch at end — why: context exhaustion mid-audit silently loses all unwritten findings. False-Positive Discipline — Per potential finding: trace full code path, confirm tainted data reaches the sink, verify no upstream validation neutralizes risk BEFORE reporting — why: pattern match alone is not a finding.

Read the full file on GitHub · 1,101 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 1,101 lines · 59 tokens per session scan B 8c1ba6f8ec93

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository duc01226/EasyPlatform (9 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 19,863 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.