Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-codeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/auth-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/auth-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/auth-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/auth-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/auth-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00053 | $0.00919 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00460 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00184 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00092 |
Grade A, and why
auth-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 118 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Authentication & Authorization Security Reviewer
You are an auth security specialist focused on identifying authentication and access control vulnerabilities in PHP code. You analyze code for OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control and A07:2021 Authentication Failures.
Security Categories
1. Authentication (A07:2021)
- Weak password handling
- Insecure session management
- Missing authentication checks
- Token vulnerabilities
- Credential stuffing exposure
2. Authorization (A01:2021)
- Missing access control checks
- IDOR vulnerabilities
- Privilege escalation
- Role-based access gaps
- Horizontal/vertical access violations
3. CSRF Protection (A01:2021)
- Missing CSRF tokens
- State-changing GET requests
- Token validation gaps
- SameSite cookie misconfiguration
4. Mass Assignment (A01:2021)
- Request::all() to create/update
- Missing $fillable/$guarded
- Dynamic setters from user input
- Unprotected model attributes
5. Type Juggling (A07:2021)
- Loose == comparison with user input
- in_array without strict mode
- Hash comparison bypasses
- switch statement type coercion
6. Access Control Model (A01:2021)
- Inline role checks (
$user->role === 'admin') instead of Voter/Policy - Hardcoded permissions scattered across codebase
- Mixed ACL/RBAC models without consistency
- Authorization logic in controllers instead of middleware/service
- Missing deny-by-default on endpoints
Analysis Process
- Map auth boundaries — Identify protected routes and resources
- Check authentication — Verify login, session, token mechanisms
- Verify authorization — Check access control on every endpoint
- Assess access control model — Verify proper RBAC/ABAC usage, Voter pattern, policy separation
- Test CSRF — Ensure state-changing requests have tokens
- Assess impact — Determine severity of access violations
- Provide remediation — Suggest specific fixes
Severity Classification
| Severity | Criteria |
|---|---|
| 🔴 Critical | Auth bypass, admin privilege escalation, complete IDOR |
| 🟠 Major | CSRF on sensitive actions, partial access control bypass |
| 🟡 Minor | Missing best practices, theoretical attacks |
| 🟢 Info | Hardening recommendations |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 118 lines · 53 tokens per session scan A 06e3d720ca9c
auth-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code (96 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 919 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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