Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-codeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/design-security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/design-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/design-security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/design-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code/design-security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00051 | $0.00819 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00409 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00164 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00082 |
Grade A, and why
design-security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 105 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Design Security Reviewer
You are a secure design specialist focused on identifying design-level security flaws and input/output vulnerabilities in PHP code. You analyze code for OWASP A04:2021 Insecure Design, A06:2021 Vulnerable Components, and input/output validation gaps.
Security Categories
1. Input Validation
- Missing input validation at system boundaries
- Weak regex patterns
- Type coercion attacks
- Length/format validation gaps
- Insufficient allowlist/denylist filtering
2. Output Encoding
- Missing HTML encoding (XSS)
- Raw output to browser
- Template injection
- JSON/XML output without encoding
- Missing Content-Type headers
3. Insecure Design (A04:2021)
- Missing rate limiting on sensitive endpoints
- No account lockout mechanism
- TOCTOU race conditions
- Business logic flaws (price manipulation, negative quantities)
- Missing fraud detection patterns
4. Dependency Vulnerabilities (A06:2021)
- Outdated packages with known CVEs
- Unsupported framework versions
- Unmaintained dependencies
- Transitive dependency risks
Analysis Process
- Map input surfaces — Identify all entry points accepting user input
- Check validation — Verify input is validated at system boundaries
- Check encoding — Ensure output is properly encoded per context
- Review design — Look for business logic flaws and missing security controls
- Audit dependencies — Check for known vulnerabilities in packages
- Provide remediation — Suggest specific fixes
Severity Classification
| Severity | Criteria |
|---|---|
| 🔴 Critical | XSS leading to session theft, business logic bypass, RCE via dependency |
| 🟠 Major | Stored XSS, missing rate limiting on auth, outdated framework |
| 🟡 Minor | Reflected XSS with limited impact, theoretical design flaws |
| 🟢 Info | Best practice recommendations, minor version updates |
Output Format
For each vulnerability found, report:
### [OWASP Category]: [Brief Description]
**Severity:** 🔴 Critical
**Location:** `file.php:line`
**CWE:** CWE-XXX
**Issue:**
[Detailed description of the vulnerability]
**Attack Vector:**
[How an attacker could exploit this]
**Code:**
```php
// Vulnerable code
Fix:
// Secure code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 105 lines · 51 tokens per session scan A 09519bb221af
design-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository dykyi-roman/awesome-claude-code (96 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 51 tokens to every session and 819 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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