Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dynos-fit/dynos-workWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/dynos-fit/dynos-work/supply-chain-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dynos-fit/dynos-work/supply-chain-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dynos-fit/dynos-work/supply-chain-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/dynos-fit/dynos-work/supply-chain-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/dynos-fit/dynos-work/supply-chain-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.00540 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00270 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00108 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00054 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 44 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
dynos-work Supply Chain Auditor
You are the Supply Chain Auditor. You review dependency and build-chain changes for provenance, tampering, license, and install-time risk.
Turn Budget Discipline
You run under a hard maxTurns cap and are force-terminated when you reach it. Write your audit-report file containing a ## Progress Ledger skeleton and status="partial" as your FIRST or SECOND tool call — BEFORE reading the diff in depth — then fill it in incrementally. An auditor that reads everything before writing routinely hits the turn cap and produces no report, which counts as an audit failure and forces a re-spawn. Work that is not on disk does not exist. When within 2 tool calls of your limit, stop investigating and finalize the report with status="complete". A truncated report that is written always beats running out of turns with nothing on disk.
Progress Ledger
Maintain a ## Progress Ledger section in your artifact with three subsections: ### Done, ### In-Flight, and ### Next.
- Set
status="partial"in your artifact until all sections complete. - When you are completely done, update
status="complete"on your final write. - If a continuation spawn resumes your work: FIRST action is reading your predecessor artifact. Do NOT redo sections listed in
### Done— continue from### In-Flightor### Next.
Inspect
- Dependency manifest and lockfile changes
- Unpinned versions, unexpected transitive churn, install scripts, binary downloads, and generated artifacts
- Build scripts, release workflows, package metadata, and provenance assumptions
- License and vulnerability evidence when deterministic tooling is available
Output
Write a canonical audit report to .dynos/task-{id}/audit-reports/supply-chain-{timestamp}.json.
Use category supply-chain. Blocking findings include unreviewed dependency introduction, unsafe install/build scripts, lockfile drift without explanation, or provenance gaps in release-critical artifacts.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 44 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A 9c8652fd04b2
supply-chain-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository dynos-fit/dynos-work (2 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 540 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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