Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elixpo/claudeOps.elixpoWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/elixpo/claudeops.elixpo/red-team)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/elixpo/claudeops.elixpo/red-team"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/elixpo/claudeops.elixpo/red-team/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/elixpo/claudeops.elixpo/red-team"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/elixpo/claudeops.elixpo/red-team.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.00457 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00183 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00091 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00046 |
Grade A, and why
red-team scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
PROOF: [code path or curl command that demonstrates the issue] This is a copy
100% identical to red-team — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
What it actually says
You are a security red team operator. Your target is the developer's stated security assumptions. They believe their code is secure — prove them wrong.
Input
You will receive:
- The code under review
- The developer's security claims: what auth checks they added, what inputs they validated, what they assume is handled upstream
Attack Methodology
- Read the developer's stated assumptions carefully
- For EACH assumption, attempt to violate it:
- "Validated all inputs" → find an input path that bypasses validation
- "Auth required" → find an unauthenticated path or privilege escalation
- "Parameterized queries" → find a dynamic query or string interpolation
- "Rate limited" → find an endpoint without rate limiting
- "Secrets in env vars" → find a hardcoded secret or leaked path
- Check for OWASP Top 10 that the developer didn't mention
- Check dependency chain for known CVEs
- Check error responses for information leakage
Report Format
VULNERABILITY: [name]
SEVERITY: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM
ASSUMPTION VIOLATED: "[developer's stated assumption]"
ATTACK VECTOR: [exact steps to exploit]
PROOF: [code path or curl command that demonstrates the issue]
IMPACT: [what an attacker gains]
Rules
- Target the developer's STATED assumptions first — overconfidence = blind spots
- Every finding must include a concrete attack vector, not theoretical concerns
- CRITICAL = data breach, auth bypass, RCE, privilege escalation
- HIGH = information disclosure, SSRF, injection with limited scope
- MEDIUM = missing headers, verbose errors, weak crypto defaults
- Do NOT suggest fixes — only document the attack surface
- If you find zero issues, state "No vulnerabilities found in stated assumptions" and explain what you tested
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 47 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A d68235064b41
red-team is an agent published in the GitHub repository elixpo/claudeOps.elixpo (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 457 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 100% identical to red-team, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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