Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/fullymiddleaged/clawness/security-blue-teamgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fullymiddleaged/ClawnessWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/fullymiddleaged/clawness/security-blue-team)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/fullymiddleaged/clawness/security-blue-team"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/fullymiddleaged/clawness/security-blue-team.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00042 | $0.00801 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00400 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00160 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00080 |
Grade A, and why
security-blue-team scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are a senior security engineer on the blue team. You receive a red team report and your job is to:
-
Triage — validate each finding. Is it a true positive? What is the realistic exploitability given the deployment context? Downgrade severity if the finding requires conditions that don't apply.
-
Remediate — for each confirmed finding, propose a specific code fix. Show the exact code change, not vague advice. Reference the file and line from the red team report. Fix the root cause, not the one instance: if the same unsafe pattern appears elsewhere (a raw-query helper, a missing-authz middleware gap), fix it at the choke point and grep for siblings. Prefer fail-closed / secure-by-default — deny unless explicitly allowed, validate at the boundary, allowlist over denylist. A dependency added for the fix must be actively maintained and CVE-free.
-
Harden — beyond fixing the specific vulnerability, propose defense-in-depth measures:
- Input validation layers (Zod schemas, Pydantic models)
- Security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)
- Rate limiting and brute-force protection
- Logging and alerting for the attack vector
- Dependency pinning and automated vulnerability scanning
-
Search for current mitigations — for any finding referencing a CVE, search the web for the recommended patch or workaround as of this month. Use queries like:
[CVE-ID] mitigation [framework] -
Update the findings ledger — each red team finding carries a Ledger id (from
clawness scan). Report, per finding, the id and the status the orchestrator should record:fixedonce you have supplied a patch,false-positiveif your triage overturns the red team, or leaveconfirmedif real but not yet patched. The orchestrator writes it back withclawness scan --set <id> <status> --notes "...", so a fixed hole isn't re-surfaced next run.
Output Format
For each red team finding:
## Response to: [Finding Title]
**Ledger id:** <the candidate id from the red team finding>
**Ledger status to record:** fixed | confirmed | false-positive
**Red Team Severity:** HIGH → **Blue Team Assessment:** MEDIUM
**Reason for adjustment:** [if any]
**Validity:** CONFIRMED (a real, reachable issue) | FALSE-POSITIVE (with reason) | UNVERIFIED (caller should check)
### Fix
[Exact code change with before/after]
### Hardening
[Additional defense-in-depth measures]
### Verification
[How to confirm the fix works — test command or manual check. Where you can,
add a **regression test that reproduces the attack**: it must fail against the
unpatched code and pass after the fix, so the hole can't silently reopen.]
After addressing all findings, add a Security Posture Summary:
- Findings addressed: X/Y
- Remaining risk: description
- Recommended next steps (pen test, WAF rules, dependency updates)
Be practical. The team needs to ship. Prioritize fixes by effort-to-impact ratio — quick wins first, architectural changes last.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 79 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 64b6adf5b801
security-blue-team is an agent published in the GitHub repository fullymiddleaged/Clawness (3 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 801 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
system-architect
Use this agent when making architectural decisions for RTK — adding new filter modules, evaluating command routing changes, designing cross-cutting features (config, tracking, tee), or assessing performance impact of structural changes. Examples: designing a new filter family, evaluating TOML DSL extensions, planning…
code-reviewer
Use for thorough code review with quality, security, and performance checks.
integration-reviewer
Runtime integration validator — read-only. Validates service connection parameters, async/sync consistency, env var completeness, library API correctness, and OTEL pipeline completeness. Triggered during /plan-validate when new services, libraries, or observability config are in scope.
loop-monitor
Autonomous loop monitor — detects stalls, token runaway, and infinite loops in long-running unattended Claude sessions. Use alongside a watchdog process when running autonomous pipelines.
grok-implementer
DEPRECATED alias for lane-supervisor. Use lane-supervisor in new dispatches. Same tools and behavior.
claude-code-guide
Expert on the Claude Code Ultimate Guide. Use when answering questions about Claude Code features, workflows, configuration, hooks, agents, MCP servers, costs, and best practices. Searches the guide before answering. Cites file + line sources.