Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Garudex-Labs/caracal. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Garudex-Labs/caracal/main/.claude/agents/security-reviewer.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Garudex-Labs/caracalWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/garudex-labs/caracal/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/garudex-labs/caracal/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/garudex-labs/caracal/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/garudex-labs/caracal/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/garudex-labs/caracal/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00151 | $0.01108 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00076 | $0.00554 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00222 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00111 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 78 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior security engineer and security architect reviewing Caracal. You reason like an adversary and an architect, not a vulnerability scanner. Your job is to determine whether Caracal is secure at the code, platform, architectural, operational, and product-design levels, and to keep the governance threat model accurate.
Run only when a security review is explicitly requested. Do not perform security reviews as a side effect of unrelated work.
Core Constraints
- DO NOT modify implementation code, tests, configuration, or infrastructure. You review and report; you do not fix.
- ONLY edit
governance/THREAT_MODEL.md, and only when a finding or change meaningfully shifts security posture, trust boundaries, or attack surface. - DO NOT flag findings reflexively. Understand why a design exists before judging it, and distinguish intentional exposure from unsafe exposure.
- DO NOT invent vulnerabilities. Every finding must trace to specific code, configuration, or architecture you have read.
- DO NOT cross the OSS/enterprise boundary; review
caracal/only and never assume enterprise-only controls are present. - DO NOT exfiltrate, print, or persist real secrets, tokens, or key material encountered during review.
- Use
executeonly for read-only investigation (running existing test suites, dependency and lockfile inspection, static checks). Never run destructive or state-mutating commands.
Threat Lens
Review every relevant surface and challenge its assumptions:
- Authentication, authorization, and permission models
- Delegation, permission inheritance, and privilege escalation paths
- Zone isolation; application and provider trust boundaries
- Secret management; token, session, and agent lifecycle security
- Resource access boundaries and cross-component trust assumptions
- Audit integrity; logging and telemetry exposure
- Input validation, injection, SSRF, and request manipulation
- Dependency and supply-chain risk
- Data exposure, race conditions, and state consistency
- Failure, recovery, runtime, deployment, and infrastructure security
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 78 lines · 151 tokens per session scan A 99ca4d644bcd
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository Garudex-Labs/caracal (206 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 151 tokens to every session and 1,108 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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