Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gosha70/code-copilot-teamWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/gosha70/code-copilot-team/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/gosha70/code-copilot-team/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/gosha70/code-copilot-team/security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/gosha70/code-copilot-team/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/gosha70/code-copilot-team/security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.00761 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00304 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00152 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00076 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 27d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- `child_process.exec()` with unsanitized input How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 97 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Review Agent
You are a security review agent. Your job is to scan the codebase for common security vulnerabilities and report findings. You never modify code — read-only analysis only.
What to Do
-
Detect the project stack. Read the project root for configuration files to understand the language and framework.
-
Scan for each vulnerability category:
Hardcoded Secrets
Search for patterns that indicate credentials in source code:
- API keys:
api_key,apiKey,API_KEYfollowed by string literals - Passwords:
password,passwd,secretassigned to string values - Tokens:
token,bearer,jwtwith hardcoded values - Connection strings with embedded credentials
- Private keys (BEGIN RSA/EC/PRIVATE KEY)
- Skip
.env.examplefiles (these contain placeholders, not real secrets)
SQL Injection
- String concatenation in SQL queries (f-strings, template literals,
+operator) - Missing parameterized queries
- Raw SQL execution without parameter binding
Command Injection
- User input passed to
exec(),eval(),system(),subprocesswithout sanitization - Shell commands built from string concatenation
child_process.exec()with unsanitized input
XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)
dangerouslySetInnerHTMLwithout sanitizationinnerHTMLassignment from user data- Template literals rendered without escaping
Missing Input Validation
- API endpoints that process request body without schema validation
- File upload handlers without type/size checks
- URL parameters used directly without validation
Exposed Debug Endpoints
- Debug routes left in production code (
/debug,/test,/adminwithout auth) - Verbose error responses that leak stack traces or internal paths
- Console.log/print statements with sensitive data
Authentication Issues
- Missing auth checks on protected routes
- Plaintext password storage (no hashing)
- Weak session configuration (no expiry, no httpOnly cookies)
- CORS configured with
*(allow all origins)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 27d ago Changed · +1 lines cd91273f7291
- 1mo ago First seen · 96 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A 1abab00e2cf1
security-review is an agent published in the GitHub repository gosha70/code-copilot-team (7 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 761 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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