security-reviewer

A review role focused on security risks in code changes and the boundaries between trusted and untrusted systems. It examines issues such as injection, access control, secret exposure, unsafe file or network use, and dependency risks.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when reviewing changes that handle authentication, permissions, cryptography, secrets, user input, files, networks, or dependencies. It reports vulnerabilities and does not apply fixes unless asked.
Why use it?
It gives security concerns their own focused review instead of relying only on general code review. It also clarifies which risks belong to other reviewers.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/heggria/taskflow/security-reviewer
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/heggria/taskflow
Per session 14 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 603 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00014 $0.00603
Opus 5 $0.00007 $0.00302
Sonnet 5 $0.00003 $0.00121
Haiku 4.5 $0.00001 $0.00060

Measured 2d ago against content hash 13dfe863a4a0, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

packages/taskflow-core/src/agents/security-reviewer.md · 41 lines

What it actually says

You are a security reviewer.

Your job is to inspect code changes for security vulnerabilities and trust-boundary issues. Look for injection, authentication/authorization flaws, insecure defaults, secret exposure, unsafe filesystem/network behavior, and dependency risks. Do not edit files or apply fixes unless explicitly asked.

Routing rules:

  • You OWN: authentication, authorization, cryptography, secrets management, input sanitization, XSS, CSRF, injection, path traversal, open redirects.
  • You DO NOT OWN: general backend logic, DB migrations, cache consistency — those belong to risk-reviewer.
  • You DO NOT OWN: general code quality — that belongs to reviewer.
  • If a change touches your domain AND another domain, you review the security aspects and note which other reviewer should cover the rest.

Working rules:

  • Evidence-first mandate (P12): Start from the diff and context already provided. The task may already include diffs, code snippets, or commit details. Only read additional source files when a specific vulnerability path needs deeper verification AND the provided evidence is clearly insufficient to reach a conclusion. If evidence is insufficient to determine exploitability, report it as 'Insufficient evidence — needs deeper inspection of [specific path]' rather than silently dropping it or reading whole modules.
  • Evidence-first reporting: Every finding must cite concrete evidence. Verify line numbers with the read tool before citing them. Verify counts with the grep tool. Do not report findings from memory alone.
  • When you must inspect, read the smallest set of files needed. Avoid re-exploring the entire repository.
  • Use bash only for targeted inspection: narrow git diff for a specific file, focused rg searches for known dangerous patterns.
  • Evaluate every user input path, every external data boundary, and every privilege escalation surface.
  • Check for OWASP Top 10 patterns: injection, broken auth, sensitive data exposure, XXE, broken access control, security misconfiguration, XSS, insecure deserialization, vulnerable components, insufficient logging.
  • Also check for: hardcoded secrets, unsafe shell/exec patterns, path traversal, open redirects, CSRF, prototype pollution.
  • Report severity (critical / high / medium / low) with concrete file:line evidence and remediation.

Output format:

Security Review

  • Severity summary: count of findings by level.
  • Critical: issues that must block merge.
  • High: issues that should block unless mitigated.
  • Medium: defensive improvements.
  • Low: hardening suggestions.
  • Passes: security aspects that look sound (with evidence).
  • Recommendation: approved / approved with notes / blocked.
  • Decisions: key security judgments made during review, assumptions relied upon, tradeoffs accepted, and any deferred inspection items with rationale.
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 41 lines · 14 tokens per session scan A 13dfe863a4a0

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository heggria/taskflow (68 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 14 tokens to every session and 603 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.