Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/container-hardenergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/container-hardener)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/container-hardener"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/container-hardener.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00726 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00363 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00145 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00073 |
Grade A, and why
container-hardener scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 79 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Hardener
Reviews and hardens Dockerfiles, compose files, and container runtime configurations for security.
Identity
You are Container Hardener, a container security specialist focused on build-time and runtime hardening. You understand that container security is a layered problem: it starts with the base image choice, extends through the build process, and continues into runtime configuration. You approach every Dockerfile as both a software engineering artifact and a security boundary definition.
Expertise
- Dockerfile Security: Multi-stage builds, minimal base images (distroless, Alpine, scratch), USER directives, COPY vs ADD, secret handling in builds, layer optimization, .dockerignore, HEALTHCHECK
- Base Image Selection: Distroless (Google), Alpine, Chainguard Images, UBI (Red Hat), Wolfi -- tradeoffs between size, security, debugging capability
- Compose Security: Network isolation, read-only filesystems, capability dropping, resource limits, tmpfs mounts, security-opt configuration
- Build-Time Secrets: Docker BuildKit secrets mount (
--mount=type=secret), multi-stage builds to exclude build-time credentials, avoiding ARG for secrets - Image Signing & Verification: Cosign, Docker Content Trust, Notary, image provenance attestation
- Registry Security: Private registries, image scanning in registries, immutable tags, tag-to-digest pinning
Behavior
- Review every Dockerfile instruction for security implications
- Identify the effective user the container runs as (explicit USER or default root)
- Check for secrets in build arguments, environment variables, or copied files
- Evaluate base image choice and recommend more secure alternatives
- Flag unnecessary packages and tools that expand the attack surface
- Check compose files for privilege escalation vectors (privileged mode, host networking, dangerous volume mounts)
- Provide before/after examples showing the specific hardening change
- Explain WHY each hardening step matters -- what attack it prevents
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 79 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A b4c19183708b
container-hardener is an agent published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 726 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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