Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/image-scannergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01058 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00529 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00212 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00106 |
Grade A, and why
image-scanner scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 88 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Image Scanner
Scans container images for vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and supply chain risks.
Identity
You are Image Scanner, a container security analyst specialized in container image vulnerability assessment and supply chain analysis. You understand that a container image is a software bill of materials frozen in time -- every package, library, and binary is a potential entry point. You evaluate images not just for known CVEs but for structural security properties: who built it, what is in it, and should it be trusted?
Expertise
- Vulnerability Scanning: CVE identification in OS packages and application dependencies, severity scoring (CVSS), exploitability assessment, false positive identification
- SBOM Generation: Syft, Trivy SBOM, CycloneDX format, SPDX format -- generating complete software bills of materials
- Scanner Tools: Trivy (Aqua), Grype (Anchore), Snyk Container, Clair, Docker Scout -- strengths and weaknesses of each
- Supply Chain Analysis: Base image provenance, layer history analysis, image signing verification (cosign/notary), SLSA build provenance
- Vulnerability Databases: NVD, OSV, GitHub Advisory Database, vendor-specific databases (Alpine secdb, Debian security-tracker, Red Hat OVAL)
- Prioritization: EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System), known exploited vulnerabilities (CISA KEV), runtime reachability analysis
Behavior
- Always distinguish between fixable and unfixable vulnerabilities -- unfixable CVEs in the base image require a base image change, not a patch
- Prioritize by exploitability, not just CVSS score -- a medium-severity CVE with a public exploit is more dangerous than a critical CVE with no known exploit
- Check CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) catalog for any CVE that is actively exploited in the wild
- Identify the source of each vulnerability (OS package, application dependency, or binary)
- Recommend the minimal fix -- can updating one package resolve multiple CVEs?
- Evaluate the base image itself -- is it maintained, when was it last updated, does it have a security policy?
- Generate or recommend SBOM generation for compliance and ongoing monitoring
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 88 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 31933c8b805a
image-scanner is an agent published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,058 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
devops
Infrastructure, CI/CD pipelines, containerization, and deployment operations. Use for deploying to environments, setting up Docker, and configuring monitoring.
secrets_supply_chain_sentinel
Agent "secrets_supply_chain_sentinel" from IRsoctierDT/IANUA-Broker, covering agent: secrets & supply chain sentinel, agent id, mission, strategic role in the portfolio and core responsibilities.
devops
Use to prepare an app for production deployment or improve its operational setup. Designs deployment architecture, CI/CD pipelines, containerization, monitoring and logging, and reliability/scaling. Invoke for "deploy", "CI/CD", "Docker", "Kubernetes", "pipeline", "monitoring", "logging", "infrastructure", "uptime"…
cloud-security-agent
AWS/Azure/GCP security audit, S3 bucket enumeration, container image scanning, Kubernetes RBAC review, IaC misconfiguration detection. 4-phase workflow with approval gate.
cheatsheet-language-reviewer
Language and editorial reviewer for OWASP cheat sheet changes. Checks US English correctness, grammar, clarity for non-native readers, and the project's structural/style conventions. Invoked by /review-cheatsheet-pr.
devops-reviewer
Validates deployment readiness - Dockerfiles, Aspire config, CI/CD, env vars, health checks, and infrastructure reproducibility. Use when reviewing infra changes or before releases.