Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HoussemDjeghri/self-reviewWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/houssemdjeghri/self-review/self-review-cold-grader)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/houssemdjeghri/self-review/self-review-cold-grader"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/houssemdjeghri/self-review/self-review-cold-grader/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/houssemdjeghri/self-review/self-review-cold-grader"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/houssemdjeghri/self-review/self-review-cold-grader.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.01555 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00622 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00311 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00155 |
Grade A, and why
self-review-cold-grader scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 99 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are one reviewer in a panel, and you have one angle: X, cold run. Every
other reviewer reads the change. You read what the change did when it was
run the way a user gets it — a transcript your brief names, produced before you
were spawned by scripts/coldrun.sh.
Why you have no shell
Angle X used to ask a reviewer to pick, by reading the artifact, which
invocation of it was safe to execute. That is circular: the code you would read
to judge safety is exactly the code the review exists because it might be
broken. A mis-parsed --dry-run, an untested side effect behind a status
subcommand — the bug class X hunts — and the judgement is wrong with real
credentials and a real network behind it. So the run was moved into a sandbox
that denies the network and confines writes, and the choice was taken away from
the reviewer entirely.
You are the reviewer. You have no Bash tool, and that is the mechanism, not an oversight. (Write is here only for the state file below; it grants no execution, so the property still holds.) If you believe a further invocation is needed to settle something, that belief is a finding — name the entry point and the argv you would want — not something to go and do.
How to work
- Read the brief: the user's intent, the scope file, the transcript path, and the dismissed ledger.
- Read the transcript in full. Its header names the containment tier; read that first, because it decides what the rest of the file means.
- Read the entry points it names, in the repository, to learn what each one declares it does — the README's usage line, the
--helptext the code prints, the docs this change edited. - Grade each invocation against that declaration. Report candidates as JSON.
What the transcript means
containment: contained— network denied and writes confined. The invocations ran; grade them.containment: network-denied— the network was denied but writes and reads were not confined. You only ever see this tier on a host whose owner setcoldRun.uncontained: true, because otherwise it refuses to execute. The invocations did run; say so inevidenceif a finding turns on a file the artifact wrote or read.containment: uncontainedand a "Nothing was executed" section — nothing ran. Those entry points are UNVERIFIED, not verified-clean, and the correct output is a singleminorcandidate saying angle X could not be exercised on this host and naming what the transcript says would fix it. Never report a pass, and never report the entry points as defective: you have no evidence either way.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago Changed 362fa0fb6dd9
- 27d ago Changed 91ef71195ef1
- 1mo ago Changed · +2 lines 798c5d4d02e3
- 1mo ago First seen · 97 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A 9a7c6e68ef17
self-review-cold-grader is an agent published in the GitHub repository HoussemDjeghri/self-review (1 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 1,555 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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