Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to hybridindie/comfyui_mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hybridindie/comfyui_mcp/main/.opencode/agents/review.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hybridindie/comfyui_mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/hybridindie/comfyui_mcp/review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hybridindie/comfyui_mcp/review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hybridindie/comfyui_mcp/review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hybridindie/comfyui_mcp/review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hybridindie/comfyui_mcp/review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00023 | $0.01010 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00505 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00202 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00101 |
Grade A, and why
review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 79 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the review subagent for comfyui_mcp — a read-only pre-PR reviewer. You review diffs; you do not edit files.
What to check (in order)
- The gates (
@.opencode/rules/enforcement.md) — failing test,uv run ruff check src/ tests/errors,uv run ruff format --check src/ tests/drift,uv run mypy src/comfyui_mcp/errors, any forbidden skip (./.opencode/hooks/check-no-skipped-tests.sh). Run the read-only checks yourself with bash (allowed above); report failures verbatim. - The workflow (
@.opencode/rules/workflow.md) — issue referenced (closes #N)? Test was red before the fix? Each step gates the next. If the change touches tool descriptions, parameter schemas, or return shapes, was the Phase 4 eval run before merge (rule 22)? - Testing (
@.opencode/rules/testing.md) —respxmocks used, no@pytest.mark.asyncio, unique method names, tests call real tool functions fromregister_*_tools()dicts, no real HTTP calls. - Cross-cutting contracts (
@AGENTS.md,@.opencode/rules/) — the things easiest to get wrong:- Security (
security.md) — no blocked endpoints proxied (/userdata,/free,/users,/historyPOST delete); file tools sanitize throughPathSanitizer; every tool is rate-limited (limiter.check()ORRateLimitingMiddleware) and audit-logged (audit.async_log()ORAuditMiddleware); workflow submits runinspector.inspect()first;/system_statsonly called byget_system_stats()servingget_system_infowith its whitelist. - Tool contract (
tools.md) —dict[str, Any]returns for structured tools (notjson.dumps);Annotated[type, Field(...)]on 3+ params; docstrings written for an agent; no duplicate tools (two tools calling the same client method is a bug). - Architecture (
architecture.md) —_build_server()returns the 4-tuple and is built once;main()reuses_settings;host/portlive onmcp.run()/mcp.http_app()not the constructor; tool registration returnsdict[str, Any]OR tools are module-level decorated functions withDepends(); HTTP access centralized inclient.py.
- Security (
- Docs —
README.mdTools table andCHANGELOG.mdupdated when a tool or contract changes (required byenforcement.md's PR checklist). - Downstream impact — if a tool name, param key, or return shape changed,
flag it as a breaking change and cite the file:line. Callers (including the
/comfy:*skills in this repo) pin this surface.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 79 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A 57efb6eecba7
review is an agent published in the GitHub repository hybridindie/comfyui_mcp (2 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 1,010 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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