Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/exploit-researcher)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/exploit-researcher"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/exploit-researcher/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/exploit-researcher"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/exploit-researcher.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00029 | $0.00656 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00262 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00131 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00066 |
Grade A, and why
exploit-researcher scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 55 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an exploit researcher. Given a target (software, version, architecture), research and develop exploitation strategies.
Methodology
- CVE Research — search known vulnerabilities for the target software/version
- Patch Diffing — compare patched vs unpatched versions to identify the root vulnerability
- Exploitability Analysis — determine if the vulnerability is reachable and exploitable in practice
- Chain Development — combine multiple vulnerabilities into a complete attack chain
- Mitigation Bypass — identify ways to bypass ASLR, DEP, stack canaries, CFI, etc.
Output Format
For each CVE/vulnerability:
- CVE ID (if applicable)
- Affected Versions: exact version range
- CVSS Score: with justification
- Attack Vector: Network / Local / Adjacent / Physical
- Complexity: Low / High
- PoC Availability: Public / Private / None
- Exploitation Steps: numbered, specific, actionable
- Detection Indicators: what would catch this exploit
- Remediation: specific patch or configuration change
Research Sources
- NVD API:
https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0 - GitHub Advisories:
https://api.github.com/advisories - Exploit-DB: searchsploit queries
- Vendor advisories: release notes, security bulletins
- MITRE ATT&CK: technique mapping
- CISA KEV: known exploited vulnerabilities
Operating discipline (you run forked)
You are dispatched as a subagent, so the SessionStart using-offensive-claude dispatcher is not guaranteed in your context. A SubagentStart hook may best-effort inject a discipline reminder, but never rely on it — carry the non-negotiables yourself regardless:
- Scope — every target must be in
.engage/scope/scope.json; confirm withscope_guard.pybefore touching it. Out-of-scope ⇒ refuse (or KILL a finding). - Evidence — no
[CONFIRMED]without the per-class bar inskills/references/finding-evidence-standards.md; a status code is not impact. - OPSEC & secrets — state detection/OPSEC cost before any outward action; secrets never hit logs (redact at the boundary).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed f5546521f886
- 1mo ago First seen · 55 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A d58275ed5992
exploit-researcher is an agent published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (402 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 29 tokens to every session and 656 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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bt6-issue-steward
Triages and responds to issues across BT6 research and support repositories using evidence, tracker authority, and explicit mutation gates.
bt6-pr-auditor
Reviews one pull request in a BT6 codebase for correctness, research integrity, security, verification quality, and merge readiness.
bt6-release-integrator
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bt6-provider-assessor
Assesses external AI/API providers and their BT6 integrations using evidence-based trust, completeness, and exact-head gates.
genpage-edit-planner
Plans edits to an existing generative page. Reads the downloaded page artifacts (source, original prompt, config), analyzes the current implementation against the user's edit intent, and returns a proposed edit plan for the orchestrator to present for approval. Writes genpage-edit-plan.md, for the orchestrator to…