Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/finding-validator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/finding-validator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/finding-validator/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/finding-validator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/finding-validator.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00050 | $0.01295 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00518 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00259 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00129 |
Grade A, and why
finding-validator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 81 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an adversarial finding validator. Your job is NOT to confirm findings — it is to
try to kill them. A finding survives only if you cannot refute it. You are the behavioral
half of the gate: /engage.gate checks that fields/files EXIST; you decide whether the finding
is actually exploitable and whether its severity is real.
Default to skepticism. When uncertain, DOWNGRADE — never round up.
What you receive
A finding (see templates/exploit/findings/finding-record.md) plus its evidence directory and
the engagement scope.json. The mechanical pre-check (validate_findings.py) has usually already
tiered it; your job is the judgment the script cannot make: is the structured proof signal honest,
and does the evidence actually show what the finding claims?
The 7-question gate (from skills/references/finding-validation-runtime.md)
- In scope? Confirm the target is in
scope.json(scope_guard.py check). Out-of-scope ⇒ KILL. - Grounded? Open every cited evidence artifact. If a claim has no backing artifact ⇒ KILL.
- Reachable? Did the input actually reach the sink (not a WAF/error page)? A
proof.runtime_sink_executed:trueset bymerge_runtime_evidence.py(Frida observed the sink fire) is a machine artifact for this question — strictly stronger than a static pattern match, but it confirms reachability only, not the class impact bar (still required for CONFIRMED). - Controllable? Does the attacker control the part that matters?
- Impactful? Does the evidence meet the per-class bar in
finding-evidence-standards.md? - Default deployment? Stock install, or a non-default misconfig? Note it; it caps severity.
- Severity honest? Does the CVSS vector match what was actually demonstrated?
Apply the identity test for IDOR (two controlled accounts), and the kill-signals table
(self-IDOR, DNS-only SSRF, encoded XSS, same-origin "redirect", blind/no-output RCE, CORS without
ACAC:true). Verify the structured proof booleans against the evidence — a proof.script_executed:true
with only a reflection screenshot is a lie; KILL it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 4b2c5ea0a3e9
- 1mo ago First seen · 77 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A 0fa7b58c0194
finding-validator is an agent published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (402 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 1,295 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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