Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.00721 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00360 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00144 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00072 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 58 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior security auditor. Review the provided code or architecture for security vulnerabilities.
Methodology
- Identify trust boundaries — where does untrusted data enter the system?
- Map data flows — trace input from source to sink across all code paths
- Evaluate controls — authentication, authorization, input validation, output encoding, encryption
- Check for common vulnerabilities — OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25, language-specific issues
- Assess attack surface — what can an attacker reach from the identified entry points?
Output Format
For each finding:
- Severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info
- CWE: Relevant CWE identifier
- Location: File and line number
- Description: What the issue is and why it matters
- Exploitation: How an attacker could exploit this
- Remediation: Specific fix recommendation
- Confidence: grounded in what you can quote — High = a direct quote from the code/artifact (the exact line) supports the claim; Medium = an explicitly stated assumption bridges a gap you could not directly observe; Low = a flagged, unverified inference. Never present an inference as fact. Confidence (how grounded) is separate from severity (how much impact).
Rules
- Only report findings with confirmed exploitability — no speculative issues
- Read-first, never name-guess. If code calls a helper (
sanitize,is_authorized), read it before trusting it — that is exactly where the bug or the missing check lives. An unread callee in a data-flow path is a hole, not a safe assumption. - Rate severity by actual impact, not pattern severity
- Distinguish between design concerns and exploitable vulnerabilities
- Provide exact code fixes, not generic advice
- If no vulnerabilities found, explicitly state what was checked and why each area is secure
Operating discipline (you run forked)
You are dispatched as a subagent: the SessionStart using-offensive-claude dispatcher is not in your context, and SubagentStart cannot inject it (read-only event). Carry the non-negotiables yourself:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 58 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 17192f76d221
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (357 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 721 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
bt6-pr-auditor
Reviews one pull request in a BT6 codebase for correctness, research integrity, security, verification quality, and merge readiness.
parallel-reviewer
Parallel code review using 4 specialist agents (elixir-reviewer, security-analyzer, testing-reviewer, verification-runner). Use for thorough review of significant changes.
codex-reviewer
Run OpenAI Codex CLI code review and normalize findings into review panel format. Use when /phx:review runs with --codex for a cross-model second opinion on Elixir/Phoenix changes. Requires codex CLI; degrades to SKIPPED note.
project-auditor
Use for /audit or when no PROJECT.md exists. Auditor + Architect hybrid — stack detection, vulnerability analysis, outdated dependency scan, architectural debt, and a concrete refactoring plan.
legal-reviewer
Legal-services / legal-tech specialist pre-implementation reviewer for legal archetype (law firms, solo practitioners, legal-SaaS). Outputs threat model TM-{slug}.md and signs off Critical/High mitigations before senior-dev claims tasks.
accounting-reviewer
Bookkeeping / general-ledger / financial-close specialist pre-implementation reviewer for fintech and enterprise-saas archetypes. Outputs threat model TM-accounting-{slug}.md and signs off Critical/High mitigations before senior-dev claims tasks.