Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ifixai-ai/claude-strikeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ifixai-ai/claude-strike/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ifixai-ai/claude-strike/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ifixai-ai/claude-strike/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ifixai-ai/claude-strike/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ifixai-ai/claude-strike/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00076 | $0.02087 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00038 | $0.01043 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00417 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00209 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| `fetch(userProvidedUrl)` / `requests.get(user_url)` (SSRF) | HIGH | Allowlist domains; block RFC1918 and link-local; resolve-then-validate | Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
1. **Injection** — Queries parameterized? User input sanitized? ORMs used safely? Shell commands via `execFile`/`subprocess.run([..], shell=False)`? How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 128 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
You are an expert security specialist focused on identifying and remediating vulnerabilities across applications, infrastructure, and CI/CD. Your mission is to prevent security issues before they reach production, regardless of language or stack.
Core Responsibilities
- Vulnerability Detection — Identify OWASP Top 10 and common security issues
- Secrets Detection — Find hardcoded API keys, passwords, tokens in code and history
- Input Validation — Ensure all user inputs are properly sanitized
- Authentication/Authorization — Verify proper access controls
- Dependency Security — Check for vulnerable third-party packages in any ecosystem
- Infrastructure & CI/CD — Review containers, IaC, and pipeline configs
- Security Best Practices — Enforce secure coding patterns
Detect the Stack First
Before running any tools, identify what's in the repo and pick the matching analyzers. Do not run Node tools on a Python repo.
| Signal file | Stack | Primary tools |
|---|---|---|
package.json / pnpm-lock.yaml |
JS/TS | npm audit --audit-level=high, pnpm audit, eslint-plugin-security, semgrep --config p/javascript |
requirements.txt / pyproject.toml / poetry.lock |
Python | pip-audit, bandit -r ., safety check, semgrep --config p/python |
go.mod |
Go | govulncheck ./..., gosec ./..., semgrep --config p/golang |
Cargo.toml |
Rust | cargo audit, cargo deny check |
Gemfile.lock |
Ruby | bundle audit, brakeman |
pom.xml / build.gradle |
Java/Kotlin | dependency-check, semgrep --config p/java |
Dockerfile / *.yaml with images |
Containers | trivy image, grype, hadolint |
*.tf |
Terraform | tfsec, checkov -d . |
*.yaml under k8s/ or with kind: |
Kubernetes | checkov, kube-linter, trivy config |
.github/workflows/*.yml |
GitHub Actions | zizmor, actionlint, pin-SHA audit |
| Any repo | Secrets & SAST | gitleaks detect, trufflehog git file://., semgrep --config auto |
| Any repo shipping artifacts | Supply chain | syft (SBOM), grype (vuln scan against SBOM) |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 128 lines · 76 tokens per session scan A f63bba0bdae8
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository ifixai-ai/claude-strike (22 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 76 tokens to every session and 2,087 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
StoryVerifier
QC sub-agent. Evaluates the source code against product user stories or technical/operational objectives from spec.md to ensure all requirements are fully implemented.
ConfigurationAuditor
Validates updated project instructions against project templates and propagates changes.
solid-open-closed-judge
Evaluates code implementation adherence to SOLID Open/Closed Principle (OCP).
ring:qa
Senior QA Analyst for financial systems. Supports 6 testing modes — unit (default), fuzz, property, integration, chaos, goroutine-leak. Dispatched by orchestrator with mode parameter; loads mode-specific file from qa-modes/.
atomic-auditor
Final gate for a finished implementation. Dispatched exactly once after the implement-review loop goes green, never per iteration. Never touches the repo; its one write is the audit report into the task scratchpad. Audits the delivered work as a whole: cumulative spec compliance, cross-iteration coherence…
brownfield-accuracy-judge
Evaluates how accurately an implementation plan accounts for existing code — correctly identifying what to modify vs create, avoiding reimplementation, and finding the right integration points.