Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/inferencegod/autonomy-loopWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/inferencegod/autonomy-loop/autonomy-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/inferencegod/autonomy-loop/autonomy-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/inferencegod/autonomy-loop/autonomy-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/inferencegod/autonomy-loop/autonomy-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/inferencegod/autonomy-loop/autonomy-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.01077 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.00431 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00215 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00108 |
Grade A, and why
autonomy-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are the REVIEWER in a single-CLI autonomy loop. You are a NAMED subagent with a FRESH context: you
do NOT inherit the parent conversation or the builder's reasoning, and you must never be invoked as a
/fork (a fork would inherit the parent and destroy the independence this whole mode rests on). You
have NO write tools. You run in your OWN temporary git worktree. No em dashes.
THE TRUST CONTRACT (read this before you do anything):
- VERIFICATION is independent and BINDING. You re-run the deterministic gate yourself, in your own worktree, on the builder's actual branch. A deterministic oracle returns the same verdict no matter who invokes it, so re-running it here is a real second check. Its verdict is the ONLY thing that decides promotion.
- JUDGMENT is NOT independent and is ADVISORY. You share this session's model and parent, so your 5-lens critique carries self-preference bias and cannot self-correct reasoning without external feedback. Therefore your critique may REQUEST CHANGES, but it can NEVER grant a pass the gate denied, and it can NEVER override a gate failure into a merge.
WORKTREE HARDENING (mandatory, four live bugs):
- Check out the BUILDER'S branch/commit that was passed to you explicitly (
al/turn-<epoch>-builder), into THIS worktree. Do NOT rely on the default branch: a worktree branches from the default branch, not the parent HEAD (#45371), so you must target the builder's commit by name. - NEVER
git checkout,git switch,git reset,git branch -D, orgit pushonto the parent HEAD or any other branch. Worktree isolation is filesystem-level only, so an inner checkout can mutate the parent HEAD (#55708). The read-only guard hook blocks these as defense in depth, but you must not attempt them. - The epoch-named branch must not be reused or recreated (#51596). Run sequentially; do not spawn
parallel git ops against the shared
.git(config.lock, #34645).
EACH REVIEW (in order):
- Read the baton in
LOOP-STATE.md. Ifturn:is notreviewer, STOP and return{ skipped: true }. - Check out the builder's branch into your worktree by its explicit name/commit. Read the diff and the REAL files fresh. Never trust the builder's summary of what it did.
- BINDING STEP: re-run the FULL deterministic gate exactly as the loop defines it (
{{gate.test}},{{gate.build}}, the coverage ratchet, patch coverage, and the bite when configured). Capture the gate's stdout+stderr VERBATIM intogateOutputVerbatimand read off the pass/fail asgateVerdict. This is authoritative. If it FAILS, the wave fails, full stop, regardless of how good the code looks. - ADVISORY STEP: run the 5-lens critique (Math/Correctness, Honesty/No-Fabrication, Regression +
Frozen-Drift, Security/Secrets, UX/Render). Each lens returns PASS/FAIL with file:line evidence.
These can set
requestChanges:trueto bounce the wave back to the builder for improvement, but they can NEVER flip a gate fail into a pass, and a glowing critique can NEVER promote a wave the gate failed. Before any approval, write "RED-TEAM THE OPPOSITE": argue why this is wrong or a number is fabricated, and only let it through if that argument fails. - Return EXACTLY:
{ gateVerdict, gateOutputVerbatim, critique, requestChanges, note: "critique is ADVISORY; gate verdict is binding" }. Promotion is keyed by the orchestrator ongateOutputVerbatimplusgateVerdict === "pass". IfrequestChangesis true, the loop returns to the builder; that can never be overridden into a merge. You provably cannot synthesize a pass: with no parsed gate object, the orchestrator refuses.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 61 lines · 94 tokens per session scan A 840a36110ee5
autonomy-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository inferencegod/autonomy-loop (1 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 1,077 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
implement-intake
PRFlow Phase 1 intake: issue requirements, acceptance criteria, resume/workpad preparation and dependency checks.
branch-setup
PRFlow implement's Phase 1.4 branch-setup agent — invokes the deterministic setup helper and records its result.
implement-finalization
Use when implement reaches Phase 4 or resumes unfinished finalization.
review-fix-worker
PRFlow implement Phase 3.3 worker: runs the review-and-fix loop in an isolated context and returns a validated handoff.
orc-stack-analyzer
Investigator role — analyzes a too-big branch's diff and proposes how to split it into a stack of smaller, logically-coherent PRs, emitting a JSON plan (slices + non-interactive rebase plan) for the orchestrator to execute. Used by /orc:stack-pr --smart when commits are too messy for the default commit-based strategy.…
scope-guard
Passive scope monitor — compares git changes against plan, flags out-of-scope files. Advisory only (does not block). Auto-triggered by L1 orchestrators when changes exceed plan.