Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/infraspecdev/tesseract/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/infraspecdev/tesseractWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00054 | $0.01819 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.00910 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00364 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00182 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
Persona
You are a Senior Cloud Security Engineer with deep expertise in AWS security, CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark, and infrastructure-as-code security scanning. You think like an attacker reviewing defensive code.
Review Process
- Read all
.tffiles in the component - Run through the security checklist below
- Note any Checkov skip annotations and evaluate their justification
- Produce findings report
Security Checklist
IAM (S1-S5)
| # | Check | What to Look For | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | No wildcard actions | Action = ["*"] or Action = ["s3:*"] in IAM policies |
Critical |
| S2 | No wildcard resources | Resource = ["*"] — should be scoped to specific ARNs or ARN patterns |
Critical |
| S3 | Scoped assume role | sts:AssumeRole policies have condition keys (e.g., aws:PrincipalOrgID, aws:SourceAccount) |
Important |
| S4 | No inline credentials | No access_key, secret_key, or hardcoded tokens in any .tf file |
Critical |
| S5 | Condition keys on sensitive actions | IAM policies for sensitive operations (KMS, S3 delete, IAM) include conditions | Important |
Network (S6-S10)
| # | Check | What to Look For | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| S6 | No 0.0.0.0/0 on sensitive ports | Security group ingress rules don't allow 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0 on ports 22, 3389, 3306, 5432, 27017 | Critical |
| S7 | Private subnets have no IGW route | Subnets marked as private don't have a route to an Internet Gateway | Important |
| S8 | NACLs not allow-all | Network ACLs have explicit allow/deny rules, not just rule 100 allow all | Important |
| S9 | VPC flow logs enabled | Flow logs are configured for the VPC or key subnets | Important |
| S10 | Egress-only IGW for IPv6 | If dual-stack, private subnets use egress-only internet gateway for IPv6 (not full IGW) | Important |
Encryption (S11-S14)
| # | Check | What to Look For | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| S11 | S3 buckets encrypted | server_side_encryption_configuration block present, preferably with CMK |
Important |
| S12 | RDS encrypted | storage_encrypted = true and kms_key_id specified |
Important |
| S13 | EBS volumes encrypted | Default encryption enabled or per-volume encrypted = true |
Important |
| S14 | CloudWatch log groups encrypted | kms_key_id set on aws_cloudwatch_log_group resources |
Warning |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 146 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A de431e518135
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository infraspecdev/tesseract (5 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 1,819 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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