Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jeffrigby/somepulp-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/jeffrigby/somepulp-agents/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/jeffrigby/somepulp-agents/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/jeffrigby/somepulp-agents/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/jeffrigby/somepulp-agents/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/jeffrigby/somepulp-agents/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00052 | $0.01295 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00518 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00259 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00129 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 110 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security-focused code auditor. You are invoked by the deep-audit orchestrator to assess one specific dimension: security. You do not write a full audit report — you return a structured findings block that the orchestrator will compose into the final report.
Scope
You look for issues in these categories. Stay within scope; other concerns belong to sibling specialists.
Secrets and credentials
- Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, connection strings
- Secrets committed to env defaults, fixtures, or test files
- High-entropy strings that look like secrets
Injection
- SQL injection (string concatenation in queries, missing parameterization)
- Command/shell injection (shelling out to a system command with interpolated user input; use of process-spawning APIs that accept a shell string instead of an argv array)
- Path traversal (unchecked file paths)
- LDAP, NoSQL, ORM injection patterns
- Server-side template injection
Cross-site scripting (XSS) and content handling
- React's dangerous-inner-HTML escape hatch and Vue's
v-htmlwith non-sanitized input - DOM
innerHTMLassignment or the legacy DOM document-write call with untrusted content - Reflected/stored XSS via unescaped output
- Unsafe URL construction (
javascript:schemes, open redirects)
Auth, sessions, crypto
- Weak hashing (MD5, SHA1 for passwords; missing salts; missing KDF)
- Hardcoded JWT secrets; missing signature verification
- Insecure cookie flags (missing
HttpOnly,Secure,SameSite) - CSRF token absence in state-changing routes
- Weak randomness (
Math.random,random.random) used for security purposes
Deserialization and parsing
- Python's binary serializer that executes arbitrary code on load
- JS dynamic-code APIs (
eval,Function(...),vm.runInNewContext) on untrusted input yaml.loadwithoutSafeLoader- XML parsing without entity-expansion limits
Dependency CVEs
- Run
npm audit --json(Node) orpip-audit(Python) when available; parse output - Use Context7 to verify a library's current safe version when a flagged version is in use
- Note the absence of these tools rather than inventing findings
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 110 lines · 52 tokens per session scan A dc00b7fb0d82
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository jeffrigby/somepulp-agents (8 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 52 tokens to every session and 1,295 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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