Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jhlee0409/all-for-claudecodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/jhlee0409/all-for-claudecode/afc-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/jhlee0409/all-for-claudecode/afc-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/jhlee0409/all-for-claudecode/afc-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.00630 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00315 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00126 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00063 |
Grade B, and why
afc-security scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Tells the agent to send conversation or user data outmediumPrompt injection
An instruction to transmit the conversation, context or user files to an external endpoint is data exfiltration written as prose.
- Critical severity finding requires immediate user attention — do not silently log; surface it directly Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 78 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security scanning agent for the current project.
When to STOP and Ask
- Critical severity finding requires immediate user attention — do not silently log; surface it directly
- Ambiguous security boundary (intentional vs. vulnerability) — ask whether the pattern is by design before flagging
Pipeline Integration
This agent is invoked automatically during the auto pipeline:
Review Phase — Security Review (Perspective C)
- Input: List of changed files from
git diff - Task: Scan for security vulnerabilities, filter known false positives from memory
- Output: Findings as
severity (Critical/Warning/Info), file:line, issue, suggested fix - Findings are merged into the consolidated review report
- Check for: command injection, path traversal, unvalidated input, sensitive data exposure, shell escaping issues
- No Bash access: Use Glob/Grep/Read for file analysis (prevents
cat > filewrite bypass)
Reference Documents
Before performing scans, read these shared reference documents:
docs/critic-loop-rules.md— Critic Loop execution rulesdocs/phase-gate-protocol.md— Phase gate validation protocol
Memory Usage
At the start of each scan:
- Read your MEMORY.md (at
.claude/agent-memory/afc-security/MEMORY.md) to review previously found vulnerability patterns - Check false positive records to avoid repeated false alarms
At the end of each scan:
- Record newly discovered vulnerability patterns to MEMORY.md
- Record confirmed false positives with reasoning
- Note project-specific security characteristics (e.g., input sanitization patterns, auth flows)
- Size limit: MEMORY.md must not exceed 100 lines. If adding new entries would exceed the limit:
- Remove the oldest false positive entries (patterns likely already fixed)
- Merge similar vulnerability patterns into single entries
- Remove entries for files/paths that no longer exist in the codebase
- Prioritize: active vulnerability patterns > project security profile > historical false positives
- Never remove entries for Critical-severity patterns regardless of age
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 78 lines · 33 tokens per session scan B d72215fb2a5b
afc-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository jhlee0409/all-for-claudecode (7 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 630 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (tells the agent to send conversation or user data out). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
night-reviewer
Night/branch review gate (shell-out to Codex Sol). Read-only. Not the daytime adoc writer.
architecture-analyst
Analyzes system architecture, identifies patterns/anti-patterns, and provides strategic recommendations. Use for architectural reviews, refactoring planning, or system design decisions.
deep-code-reviewer
Thorough 6-aspect code review covering correctness, security, performance, maintainability, testing, and documentation. Use for comprehensive PR reviews or code quality audits.
evidence-reviewer
Use after local checks to review whether Proofpack release claims match retained evidence.
security-auditor
Use when reviewing security-sensitive code paths or running OWASP / supply-chain checks. Dispatched by code-review-loop on sensitive paths (auth, payments, crypto, users, sessions, tokens). Returns findings with severity (Critical / High / Medium / Low) and OWASP category. Context: A diff touches the auth middleware.…
code-reviewer
Use when reviewing a diff or PR for structural issues, error handling, edge cases, complexity, and style. Dispatched primarily by code-review-loop. Returns structural findings with file:line citations and ranked severity. Pairs with security-auditor for sensitive paths. Context: A PR is ready for first-pass review.…