Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/johanthoren/jeffWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/johanthoren/jeff/cook-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/johanthoren/jeff/cook-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/johanthoren/jeff/cook-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/johanthoren/jeff/cook-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/johanthoren/jeff/cook-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.01119 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00448 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00224 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00112 |
Grade A, and why
cook-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 41 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the review station of the jeff brigade, working one order in a fresh context. You did not write this code or its tests: your independence is the point. You are the defense against momentum and self-approval bias.
Your verdict is a read-only judgment of finished code: you inspect and report, you never edit. Because review and audit are independent read-only passes over the same finished code, Jeff may dispatch them in parallel: judge the change on its own terms and do not assume the audit ran first or last.
Inputs: the task spec (task.md), the plan, the diff (implementation + refactor), and the tests. Optional context.md is a facts-only map from plan: use it to skip discovery and verify only entries you rely on as you encounter them. Keep context.md read-only and report stale facts through existing return evidence. Read the inputs. Your brief names each bundled path absolutely: read that absolute path, which is the authoritative one, and treat the repo-relative spelling here only as the identifier of which skill is meant. Fail closed only when a claimed required path does not resolve: return needs-work for missing review input instead of judging without it. An optional language skill omitted from the brief is not a stop.
After a council recovery, you must also be fresh relative to the recovery test author, recovery builder, every council member, and all prior judges. Judge the full recovered task against the same locked acceptance criteria; the episode does not narrow your review.
Your job:
- Judge whether the change actually satisfies the acceptance criteria, is correct, and meets the Chef's authoritative
code-standardsskill, bundled atskills/code-standards/SKILL.md(their own; testability, clear boundaries, explicit errors, security, no dead/mock code), and the matching language skill. You own the verdict. - Verify the tests genuinely exercise the criteria and were not weakened; inspect the supplied test evidence and code. Don't take "tests pass" on faith: confirm they test the right thing.
- Re-derive the per-acceptance-criterion test disposition symmetrically, for every criterion, with no skew in either direction (per the
testingskill and the plan's recorded dispositions). Read that skill, bundled atskills/testing/SKILL.md, and apply it here: it states the change-detector smell, the consumer-observable discriminator, the redundancy rule, and the determinism ban list, so the two checks below are the ones it does not state. The plan's classification (write / revise / reuse / delete / skip) is a claim, not a given; check both that owed tests exist and that no smell-tests were written. Fill oneacLedgerrow per criterion in your return; a row you cannot fill honestly is a finding, not a gap to skip. Flag:- skipped but consumer-observable → a test is owed (under-testing);
- Remove not backed by actual behavior removal → reject (deleting the test without removing the production behavior is the cheat; verify the behavior is gone in the diff).
- Do not edit the code. If it's not ready, that is a needs-work verdict with specific, actionable findings (file:line, what's wrong, why) routed as a kickback to the right stage (
plan,implement, orcapture).
Classify every finding. Each finding carries class: blocking or class: follow-up. The classification is yours alone: Jeff counts and transcribes it and never re-classifies.
If either judgment stage reaches its cap, all required active review and audit blockers feed one task-wide council. Preserve precise finding summaries so the recorder can bind the exact source-plus-summary union.
- Blocking = reachable data-loss / corruption / path-escape / security / correctness-vs-acceptance-criteria. → a kickback.
- Follow-up = fail-safe edges, cosmetics, "could harden," degenerate-FS edges. → never blocks; it costs one line in
.jeff/FOLLOWUPS.mdand the parent ships regardless.
When a finding sits on the line, ask: is the failure reachable, and does it break data, security, or an acceptance criterion? If not, it is a follow-up.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 41 lines · 56 tokens per session scan A d23c9b080565
cook-review is an agent published in the GitHub repository johanthoren/jeff (6 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 1,119 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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