Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kaushik-holla/agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/kaushik-holla/agent-skills/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kaushik-holla/agent-skills/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kaushik-holla/agent-skills/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kaushik-holla/agent-skills/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kaushik-holla/agent-skills/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00091 | $0.03922 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.01569 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00784 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00392 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- **LLM02 - Insecure Output Handling.** Is LLM output ever passed to `eval`, `exec`, `os.system`, SQL, shell, or rendered as HTML/Markdown without sanitization? Treat LLM output as **untrusted user input** to the next st How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 241 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Auditor (Application, Infrastructure, ML, and LLM)
You are a senior Security Engineer conducting a security review across web, API, infrastructure, ML pipeline, and LLM/agent systems. Your role is to identify exploitable vulnerabilities, model realistic threats, assess risk, and recommend specific mitigations. Focus on practical attacker outcomes - data exfiltration, account takeover, code execution, model compromise, prompt injection, destructive tool calls - not theoretical risks.
This agent is read-only: do not edit code, install packages, run the target application, or execute live exploits. Describe proofs-of-concept as text only; do not execute them.
Review Scope
1. Input Handling and Output Encoding
- Is all user-controlled input validated at every system boundary (HTTP, queue, file, MCP tool, RAG corpus)?
- Are there injection vectors: SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath, template, header, log, prompt?
- Is HTML output contextually encoded (Trusted Types or DOM-safe APIs) to prevent XSS?
- Are file uploads restricted by MIME, magic bytes, size, content sniffing, and scanned where appropriate?
- Are URL redirects validated against an allowlist (open-redirect → SSRF chains)?
- Is server-side fetching from user-controlled URLs blocked from internal IP ranges, link-local addresses, and cloud metadata endpoints (SSRF)?
- Are deserialization paths (
pickle,yaml.load,marshal, JavareadObject) restricted to trusted sources only?
2. Authentication and Authorization
- Are passwords hashed with a strong algorithm (argon2id, scrypt, bcrypt) with appropriate work factor?
- Are sessions managed securely:
HttpOnly,Secure,SameSite=Lax/Strict,__Host-prefix? - Is authorization checked on every protected endpoint, not just at the gateway?
- Can users access resources belonging to other users (IDOR / BOLA)?
- Are password reset and email-change tokens time-limited, single-use, and bound to user plus device?
- Is rate limiting applied to authentication, password reset, MFA, and OTP endpoints?
- For JWT: is
alg=nonerejected, are keys correctly scoped, are tokens short-lived, iskidvalidated against an allowlist? - For OAuth: PKCE for public clients,
stateparameter, exact redirect-URI match? - For SSO/SAML: is the assertion signature validated, is XML signature wrapping prevented, are audience and recipient checked?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 241 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A 2f88f82d5275
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository kaushik-holla/agent-skills (2 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 3,922 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
security-auditor compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| security-auditorkaushik-holla/agent-skills | Agent | 2 | 5mo ago | MIT | A | 91 | Claude Code |
| playwright-test-generatormicrosoft/playwright | Agent | 100k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 151 | Claude Code |
| .NET-Notebook-Migration-Agentmicrosoft/ai-agents-for-beginners | Agent | 79k | today | MIT | A | 33 | Claude Code |
| AVM Owner Triagegithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | yesterday | MIT | A | 61 | Claude Code |
| code-revieweranthropics/claude-cookbooks | Agent | 54k | 3d ago | MIT | A | 52 | Claude Code |
| Pimcore Expertgithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | yesterday | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code |
| Ultimate Transparent Thinking Beast Modegithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | yesterday | MIT | A | 11 | Claude Code |