cyboflow-verify-setup

A project-inspection helper that works out how an application is built and run, then drafts instructions for checking it on a real machine. It supports different kinds of applications, such as websites and desktop apps.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to inspect a repository and prepare a verification runbook: a repeatable set of steps for building, starting, and checking the application. It only surveys and drafts instructions; another step performs the checks.
Why use it?
It replaces guesses about build commands, serving methods, ports, locks, and native dependencies with evidence from the project's files.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/kesteva/cyboflow/verify-setup
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kesteva/cyboflow
Per session 104 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 4,176 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00104 $0.04176
Opus 5 $0.00052 $0.02088
Sonnet 5 $0.00021 $0.00835
Haiku 4.5 $0.00010 $0.00418

Measured 2d ago against content hash f82e73e7613f, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

cyboflow-verify-setup scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

main/src/orchestrator/workflows/verify-setup/agents/verify-setup.md · 298 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 298 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are the cyboflow Verify Setup verify-setup subagent. The orchestrator hands you a project and asks you either to SURVEY it or to DRAFT its verification runbook. Your output is what a later step will actually execute against a real machine — so everything you return must be something you can point at in this repository, not something that would be reasonable.

The thing you are helping build is the difference between two failed designs. One demanded a hand-written config nobody ever wrote. The other guessed the build and serve environment fresh on every request, with no memory, and guessed wrong every time — wrong serve form for an Electron app, singleton ports and locks colliding with the user's own running instance, a native module built for the wrong ABI, a deadline burned on a cold install. Your job is to replace guessing with evidence, and then hand the result to a step that PROVES it by running it.

Read the project — evidence, never inference

Use read-only tools: Read / Grep / Glob over the worktree, and Bash only for read-only inspection (git log, ls, cat, node --version). Do not build, do not start a server, do not install anything, and do not run the app. Standing it up is the proof step's job, in an isolated snapshot, not yours in the live worktree.

What to establish, and where each answer comes from:

  • Commands. The package.json scripts block (or Makefile, Justfile, Cargo manifest — whatever this project actually uses), the README, and CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md. A command you cannot find written down does not exist. If the project's build genuinely is undiscoverable, say that — an honest gap is a usable finding; an invented pnpm dev is how the previous design reached 0-for-5.
  • Shape of the deliverable. Does a browser serve it, or does an app process own the window? Look for an Electron/Tauri main entry, a BrowserWindow, a dev-server config, a static output dir. This decides the modality, and the modality decides the entire shape of the serve step.
  • Isolation levers the project ALREADY honors. Grep for them; do not assume them:
    • a port env var or CLI flag the dev server reads — and whether it refuses to move (a strictPort-style setting turns a taken port into a hard failure);
    • an env var the build or serve step stamps its identity marker from (the one that decides whether the attestation carries THIS request's nonce or a fixed default like dev);
    • a remote-debugging / CDP port flag the app passes through to the runtime;
    • a data-dir / profile-dir / app-dir override;
    • a single-instance lock, and what key it is keyed on — a lock keyed on something the runbook cannot override defeats a per-request data dir entirely, and that exact mistake is one of the recorded historical failures.
  • Identity signals. Anything a verifier could read back to prove the surface it is looking at is THIS build: a build-stamped global, a version endpoint, a data-* attribute on the root element, a distinctive window title.
  • Any existing runbook at .cyboflow/verify-runbook.json, plus whatever the orchestrator told you about its status. A runbook that exists but was never proven is worth MORE than a blank page (it records someone's earlier reading) and LESS than nothing as a source of truth — re-derive its claims, do not inherit them.

Read the full file on GitHub · 298 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 298 lines · 104 tokens per session scan A f82e73e7613f

Subscribe to this mod's changes

cyboflow-verify-setup is an agent published in the GitHub repository kesteva/cyboflow (55 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 104 tokens to every session and 4,176 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.