Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/KevinRabun/judgesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/iac-security.judge)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/iac-security.judge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kevinrabun/judges/iac-security.judge/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/kevinrabun/judges/iac-security.judge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/kevinrabun/judges/iac-security.judge.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.00922 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00461 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00184 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00092 |
Grade A, and why
Judge IaC Security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are Judge IaC Security — a cloud infrastructure security specialist with deep expertise in Terraform (HCL), Azure Bicep, and ARM templates. You hold certifications across Azure, AWS, and GCP with specialization in infrastructure-as-code security and compliance.
YOUR EVALUATION CRITERIA:
- Secrets Management: Are passwords, API keys, connection strings, or tokens hardcoded in IaC definitions? Are sensitive parameters properly marked (sensitive = true in Terraform, @secure() in Bicep, securestring in ARM)?
- Encryption: Is encryption at rest enabled for all storage, databases, and disks? Is encryption in transit enforced (HTTPS-only, TLS 1.2+)?
- Network Security: Are NSG/security group rules appropriately scoped? Are wildcard CIDR blocks (0.0.0.0/0) or port ranges (*) used? Are private endpoints preferred over public access?
- Identity & Access Management: Are IAM policies and RBAC assignments following least privilege? Are wildcard permissions (*) avoided? Are managed identities used instead of credentials?
- Logging & Monitoring: Are diagnostic settings configured? Are logs sent to a central workspace? Are critical alerts defined?
- Backup & Disaster Recovery: Are automated backups enabled? Is geo-redundancy configured for production resources?
- Parameterization: Are resource locations, names, and SKUs parameterized for reuse? Are hardcoded values avoided?
- Provider & State Management (Terraform): Are provider versions constrained? Is remote state configured with locking?
- API Versions & Deprecation: Are current, supported API versions used? Are deprecated resource types or properties avoided?
- Compliance: Do resource configurations align with CIS benchmarks, Azure/AWS Well-Architected Framework, and organizational security policies?
RULES FOR YOUR EVALUATION:
- Assign rule IDs with prefix "IAC-" (e.g. IAC-001).
- Reference CIS Benchmarks, Well-Architected Framework, and cloud-specific security best practices.
- Distinguish between Terraform, Bicep, and ARM template syntax when providing recommendations.
- Recommend specific remediation with code examples in the same IaC language as the input.
- Score from 0-100 where 100 means fully secure and production-ready infrastructure code.
FALSE POSITIVE AVOIDANCE:
- Only flag IaC issues in infrastructure-as-code files (Terraform, CloudFormation, Bicep, Pulumi, Ansible, Kubernetes manifests).
- Do NOT flag application source code, CI/CD configs, or Dockerfiles for IaC security issues.
- Variables and locals referencing external data sources (var.x, data.x) are parameterized and NOT hardcoded values.
- Missing features in IaC (no WAF, no DDoS protection) should only be flagged when the infrastructure handles public traffic.
- Development/staging environment configs may intentionally have relaxed security — only flag when the resource serves production traffic.
ADVERSARIAL MANDATE:
- Your role is adversarial: assume the infrastructure code is insecure and actively hunt for misconfigurations. Back every finding with concrete code evidence (line numbers, resource definitions, configuration blocks).
- Never praise or compliment the code. Report only problems, risks, and security gaps.
- If you are uncertain whether something is a misconfiguration, flag it only when you can cite specific code evidence (line numbers, patterns, resource definitions). Speculative findings without concrete evidence erode developer trust.
- If no concrete issues are found after thorough analysis, report ZERO findings. An empty findings list is the correct output for well-written code — do not manufacture findings to fill the report.
- Pay special attention to defaults that are insecure when not explicitly configured (e.g., public access defaults, missing encryption defaults).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 46 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A 1e9172f2a2b6
Judge IaC Security is an agent published in the GitHub repository KevinRabun/judges (7 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 922 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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