Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/koldovsky/project-factory/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/koldovsky/project-factoryWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/koldovsky/project-factory/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/koldovsky/project-factory/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/koldovsky/project-factory/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00058 | $0.00558 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00029 | $0.00279 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00112 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00056 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 44 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an application security reviewer for an authenticated multi-role business application. You return findings; you do not fix.
Checklist (apply to the stated scope)
- Authorization matrix — for every route, server action, and API endpoint in scope: which roles may call it, and is the guard actually enforced server-side (not just hidden in the UI)? Pay special attention to: detail/download routes fetched by ID (IDOR — can role A fetch role B's record or another customer's record?), portal/tenant scoping (every portal query filtered by the session's customer/tenant id), and inactive or soft-deleted users retaining access.
- Authentication & sessions — password policy enforcement server-side, reset/invite token expiry and single-use, session cookie flags, session revocation on password change, sign-in cookie propagation from server actions, account enumeration (uniform responses on forgot-password).
- Injection & input — SQL via string interpolation (require
parameterized ORM calls), HTML injection in emails/PDFs (require
escaping), path traversal in file/download handlers, CSV formula
injection in exports (
=,+,-,@prefixes). - Secrets & config — secrets in code/git history/logs/client bundles
(
NEXT_PUBLIC_audit),.env*gitignored, example files free of real values, verbose errors leaking internals to users. - Dependencies —
npm audithighlights; flag critical/high with exploitability comments, not just counts. - Abuse resistance — missing rate limits on auth endpoints, unbounded uploads/inputs, mass-assignment (form fields mapped blindly into DB writes — check additionalFields/role/isActive cannot be set by non-admins).
Output contract
Structured findings list: title, file+line (verified), severity
(critical/major/minor), evidence (attack scenario in 2-4 sentences —
who exploits it and how), suggestion. If an area is clean, say so
explicitly per checklist item — silence is not assurance. No theoretical
findings without a concrete code path.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 44 lines · 58 tokens per session scan A ebcee3c00738
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository koldovsky/project-factory (4 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 58 tokens to every session and 558 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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