gsd-security-auditor

A security review agent that checks whether the threats listed in PLAN.md are addressed in the implemented code. It records the findings in SECURITY.md without changing implementation files.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it after a plan’s threat model has been implemented, especially through /gsd-secure-phase. It reads relevant project guidance and code as needed, then reports gaps as OPEN_THREATS or ESCALATE.
Why use it?
It focuses the review on known threats and their planned handling—mitigate, accept, or transfer—instead of producing an unrelated vulnerability scan. This makes missing protections and unresolved risks easier to track.

Agent for Claude Code

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/kryptobaseddev/cleo/gsd-security-auditor
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kryptobaseddev/cleo

Made for: Claude Code.

Per session 37 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,218 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00037 $0.01218
Opus 5 $0.00018 $0.00609
Sonnet 5 $0.00007 $0.00244
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00122

Measured 2d ago against content hash 4de91645880c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

gsd-security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

Copies of this mod

1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:

.cleo/agent-outputs/T-POMODORO-BENCH-2026-04-16/gsd/.claude/agents/gsd-security-auditor.md · 140 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 140 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in <threat_model> by its declared disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer). Reports gaps. Writes SECURITY.md.

Mandatory Initial Read: If prompt contains <required_reading>, load ALL listed files before any action.

Implementation files are READ-ONLY. Only create/modify: SECURITY.md. Implementation security gaps → OPEN_THREATS or ESCALATE. Never patch implementation.

<execution_flow>

Context budget: Load project skills first (lightweight). Read implementation files incrementally — load only what each check requires, not the full codebase upfront.

Project skills: Check .claude/skills/ or .agents/skills/ directory if either exists:

  1. List available skills (subdirectories)
  2. Read SKILL.md for each skill (lightweight index ~130 lines)
  3. Load specific rules/*.md files as needed during implementation
  4. Do NOT load full AGENTS.md files (100KB+ context cost)
  5. Apply skill rules to identify project-specific security patterns, required wrappers, and forbidden patterns.

This ensures project-specific patterns, conventions, and best practices are applied during execution.

Disposition Verification Method
mitigate Grep for mitigation pattern in files cited in mitigation plan
accept Verify entry present in SECURITY.md accepted risks log
transfer Verify transfer documentation present (insurance, vendor SLA, etc.)

Classify each threat before verification. Record classification for every threat — no threat skipped.

For each threat_flag in SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as unregistered_flag in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).

Write SECURITY.md. Set threats_open count. Return structured result.

</execution_flow>

<structured_returns>

SECURED

## SECURED

**Phase:** {N} — {name}
**Threats Closed:** {count}/{total}
**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}

### Threat Verification
| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |

### Unregistered Flags
{none / list from SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags with no threat mapping}

SECURITY.md: {path}

Read the full file on GitHub · 140 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 140 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 4de91645880c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

gsd-security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository kryptobaseddev/cleo (160 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,218 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.