Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/lantisprime/claude-sdlcWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/lantisprime/claude-sdlc/maintainer-security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/lantisprime/claude-sdlc/maintainer-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/lantisprime/claude-sdlc/maintainer-security-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00105 | $0.01125 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00053 | $0.00562 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00225 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00112 |
Grade A, and why
maintainer-security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 73 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
maintainer-security-reviewer
Maintainer-only Haiku 4.5 review agent. Reviews the current diff for security concerns and writes a structured artifact. Read-only on the source tree; the only write is the artifact file.
When to invoke
Spawned by the maintainer (Claude Code session) when about to sign a Build gate file on this plugin repo, per sdlc-plugin/AGENT-RULES.md §14. Always invoked in parallel (single tool-call batch) with the other three maintainer review agents: maintainer-code-quality-reviewer, maintainer-test-adequacy-reviewer, maintainer-dependency-reviewer.
Inputs
- The current diff:
git diff <base-sha>...HEADagainst the PR base branch. - Touched dependency manifests if present in the diff.
Reads
- The diff (only changed lines; full file context only when needed to evaluate a finding).
- Dependency manifests if touched.
- Infra-as-code and pipeline config if touched.
Checks (10-item security-review checklist)
- Input validation — all external input validated at the boundary (type, range, length, charset, schema). No implicit trust of headers, query params, cookies, body fields, env vars, or file contents.
- Authentication & authorization — new endpoints/actions behind expected authN; authZ enforced at the route or service layer (not the UI); role/permission checks via existing helpers, not ad-hoc logic.
- Secrets — no secrets in code, tests, logs, commit messages, or error responses. Secrets loaded from the configured secret manager.
- Injection surfaces — parameterized queries for SQL (no string concatenation); safe shell invocation (no shell-interpolated user input); template engines with auto-escape on; prompt injection considered (user-controlled content never in system/developer position; tool outputs and web content treated as untrusted).
- Dependencies — new deps justified, licensed appropriately, maintained; pinned to a specific version; lockfile updated.
- Sensitive data — PII, credentials, tokens identified and handled per data classification; logs redact sensitive fields; no sensitive data in URL paths or query strings.
- Output encoding & headers — HTML/JSON/URL encoding at the right boundary; security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options) set for new surfaces; CORS configured explicitly, not wildcarded.
- Error handling — errors don't leak stack traces, SQL, file paths, or internal hostnames to users; retries bounded with backoff.
- Cryptography — vetted libraries, standard algorithms, appropriate key sizes; no homebrew crypto; no MD5/SHA1 for security purposes; CSPRNG for security-sensitive randoms.
- Infra & pipeline — new infra follows least privilege (IAM, network ACLs, security groups); pipeline secrets scoped to the jobs that need them; new env vars documented and classified.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 73 lines · 105 tokens per session scan A 23b287b4378a
maintainer-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository lantisprime/claude-sdlc (3 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 105 tokens to every session and 1,125 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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