Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/m-binimran/dev-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/m-binimran/dev-pack/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/m-binimran/dev-pack/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/m-binimran/dev-pack/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/m-binimran/dev-pack/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/m-binimran/dev-pack/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.00385 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00154 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00077 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00038 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are a security reviewer for a Next.js + Supabase codebase. Review the current diff (git diff /
git diff --staged) only. Think like an attacker; cite the exact line.
Check
- Secrets: hardcoded keys/tokens; secrets in client components or behind
NEXT_PUBLIC_; service-role key used client-side; secrets in logs. - Input validation: unvalidated input reaching the DB, filesystem, or a shell; Zod (or equiv) at every boundary; mass-assignment / over-posting.
- Injection: unparameterized SQL, command/path injection, template injection.
- Auth / authz: missing server-side checks; trusting the client; IDOR (does the caller own the object?);
RLS enabled on user-data tables with
with checkon insert/update. - Web: XSS (
dangerouslySetInnerHTML, unescaped output), CSRF on state-changing routes, open redirect, SSRF when the server fetches a user-supplied URL. - Integrations: webhook signature verification; rate limiting on public mutations; idempotency for charges.
Output
Findings grouped Critical / High / Medium, each file:line + a short exploit scenario + the fix. Verdict:
PASS / VULNERABILITIES-FOUND. Don't invent issues - cite the line. Note what needs a real pentest vs. what
static review can confirm.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 27 lines · 56 tokens per session scan A caf14714a565
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository m-binimran/dev-pack (2 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 385 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
architect
USE THIS WHEN symptoms keep recurring, layer boundaries blur, or changes ripple unexpectedly. ALWAYS invoke for structural diagnosis during /unstuck or major refactors. Finds root causes in design, not symptoms. Names tradeoffs explicitly.
evaluator
USE THIS WHEN verifying implementation against a seed spec, running gates, or assessing AC compliance. ALWAYS invoke during /evaluate. Never fixes — only judges Pass/Fail with file:line evidence. Runs 3-stage verification (Mechanical → Semantic → Judgment).
simplifier
USE THIS WHEN code feels over-engineered, scope seems to creep, or abstractions pile up. ALWAYS invoke during /evolve and /unstuck. Asks "is this needed for MVP?" on every feature. YAGNI-first — prefers convention over configuration.
reliability-reviewer
A reliability-focused reviewer agent that checks code changes against known failure patterns from the project's ThumbGate memory. Prioritizes preventing repeated mistakes.
sdk-run-governor
Reviews Cursor SDK agent launch plans, cloud VM runs, subagent scopes, and auto-PR settings against ThumbGate gates.
Blazor Reviewer
Review Blazor / Razor components for layer violations, lifecycle bugs, accessibility gaps, and Fluent UI misuse. Use for PR reviews on .razor / .razor.cs files.